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This thesis determines the primary reasons why first-term
enlistees assigned to critical occupations decide against
reenlisting in the Marine Corps. The reasons given for not
reenlisting are determined by analyzing responses to the
Marine Corps Enlisted Separation Questionnaire over the period
of fiscal 1985 through fiscal 1989 (third quarter)
.
Questionnaire responses are analyzed using cross-tabulations
and frequency distributions according to demographic
characteristics (marital status, gender, race, and pay grade)
and occupational skill requirements. The results suggest
that, for most Marines, lack of promotion opportunity is the
main reason for not reenlisting. Other reasons vary by
demographic and occupational skill groups. Fcunily separation
influences the decisions of women and E-5s, while Marines in
more technical specialties are more concerned with
compensation. Reenlistment incentives are evaluated using the
results of this study. Recommendations are offered to improve
current incentives and the criteria for reenlistment.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE
A. GENERAL
In a prepared statement submitted to the Senate Armed
Services Committee on 24 March 1988, the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, Grant S. Green,
clearly outlined the importance of retaining military
personnel. He stated that:
The penalties associated with insufficient retention
are severe. Most notable is reduced mission capability,
but there are longer term effects that are no less
serious. Lower retention leads to less selectivity in
choosing the future leaders of the officer and enlisted
force and fewer experienced people in the middle grades.
Because lower retention drives higher accessions, it means
greater training costs and higher trainee-to-supervisor
ratios. It means placing substantially greater demands
on the remaining Service members. Most serious of all,
it means that all of these conditions will continue for
many years, because significant losses of trained and
experienced officers and enlisted members cannot be
recouped in the short term. [Ref 1: p. 113]
Mr. Green later pointed out that there is a need to be
concerned about the future, especially considering that in
fiscal 1987 the Marine Corps achieved only 93 percent of its
first-term reenlistment goal.
Balanced against the need to retain enlisted personnel is
the issue of their "quality" . All Military Services emphasize
the recruitment of high-quality individuals. For initial
enlistment, measures of quality are usually based on aptitude
test scores and educational attainment (high school
graduation) . The Marine Corps has been particularly
successful in bringing highly qualified members into its
ranks, as recently noted by LtGen J. I. Hudson, Deputy Chief
of Staff for Manpower at Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC)
.
He stated that the Marine Corps has increased the percentage
of high school graduates recruited from 77.8 in fiscal 1980
to 98.1 in fiscal 1987, while the percentage of new recruits
with above-average scores (50th percentile or higher) on the
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) has increased from 5 9.0
in fiscal 1980 to 67.6 in fiscal 1987. [Ref. 2:p. 211]
The Services emphasize the recruitment of high quality
enlistees because they learn relatively quickly and experience
generally fewer disciplinary problems. In addition, high
quality recruits are more likely than their counterparts to
complete the first term of enlistment. However, the Services
have also found that high quality personnel are less likely
to reenlist at the completion of the first term.
The Marine Corps (like the other Services) offers various
reenlistment incentives. However, while the quality of the
first-term population has dramatically improved over the past
ten years, the reenlistment incentives being offered over the
same period have remained relatively unchanged. This
2
situation may help to explain the recent difficulties
experienced by the Marine Corps in meeting first-term
reenlistment goals.
B. SCOPE OF THESIS
This thesis focuses on military occupational specialties
(MOSs) in the Marine Corps that have been critically short
since fiscal 1985. It also seeks to determine the role of
available reenlistment incentives in influencing the
reenlistment behavior of first-term personnel assigned to
critically short specialties. To fully develop the connection
between the critical specialties and available reenlistment
incentives, background information is examined on the criteria
for first-term reenlistment. The reenlistment criteria are
evaluated as to whether they guarantee the continued service
of highly qualified Marines beyond the first term. The study
further examines the current reenlistment incentives offered
to first-term Marines, and compares these incentives to those
offered by the Army. The final elements of background
information discuss general Marine Corps policy for providing
balance to the enlisted force and the criteria for designating
an MOS as "critical".
C . METHODOLOGY
The bulk of background information for this thesis was
provided by the Enlisted Plans Section of the Manpower Policy
and Plans Division at HQMC. Additional information was
obtained from various Marine Corps directives. The first area
of analysis determines which Marine Corps' MOSs are considered
critical. To determine these specialties, first-term
Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) multiples are analyzed from
fiscal 1985 to the present. (SRB multiples are explained in
Chapter II under current reenlistment incentives.) In this
study, it is assumed that the presence of a multiple indicates
a potential future shortage in the respective occupational
specialty. In addition, it is assumed that the higher the
multiple, the more critical the specialty is to the Marine
Corps
.
In the second area of analysis, data compiled by the
Manpower Analysis section at HQMC using Enlisted Separation
Questionnaires are examined. Questionnaire data on first-
term Marines in critical occupations are analyzed using cross-
tabulation and frequency distributions. These techniques are
used to characterize differences among the respondents based
on the background factors of marital status, gender, race and
pay grade. Furthermore, the data are divided by Department
of Defense (DoD) occupational area and analyzed using
frequency distributions to detect trends according to
occupational skill similarity. Finally, a relationship is
estc±)lished between the factors influencing the separation of







The literature review begins with an examination of
the factors affecting personnel to remain in or separate from
an organization, both from civilian and military perspectives.
Next, studies that focus on the purpose and effectiveness of
reenlistment incentives are discussed. Finally, the
literature review addresses the importance of quality in
retaining enlisted personnel.
2 . Retention and Turnover Behavior
a. Civilian Studies
The parallel between civilian employment and
military service centers around the individual's voluntary
choice to leave or remain in an organization. Stolzenberg
and Winkler [Ref . 2] analyzed the causes and consequences of
voluntary separation by developing an analytical framework
based on previous civilian research. The basis of their study
comes from research conducted by J. W. Thibaut and H. H. Kelly
in 1959 in The Social Psychology of Groups. Thibaut and
Kelley propose "...that people evaluate their experience in
groups according to the costs and benefits involved in
maintaining membership in the group" [Ref. 2:p. 4]. Their
proposition is formed around the concepts of comparison level
(within the organization) and comparison level for
alternatives (outside the organization) . The comparison level
requires and individual to evaluate his or her satisfaction
in a group relative to the other group members. The
comparison level for alternatives requires a group member to
evaluate his or her satisfaction in a group relative to
membership in another group. As the authors state:
The key point about the comparison level is that it
determines whether workers are happy with their jobs, but
it does not determine whether they leave them. The key
feature of the comparison level for alternatives is that
it determines whether workers leave their jobs, but not
whether they are happy with them. Accordingly, workers
sometimes leave jobs they like, or stay in jobs they do
not like. [Ref. 2:p. 5]
In addition to Thibaut and Kelley, Stolzenberg
and Winkler borrow from the work of Herbert Simon to add two
more aspects to their framework of voluntary separation.
First, Simon treats low satisfaction as a precipitator to
search for a more satisfying job, thus establishing job search
as a behavioral link between job satisfaction and the decision
to quit. Second, Simon allows the result that a search for
an alternate job may be unsuccessful, which causes the
formerly unsatisfying job to become more satisfying.
Within the above framework, Stolzenberg and
Winkler employ the following six characteristics as factors
that contribute to job comparison and the eventual decision






4. dispute resolving mechanisms
5. fringe benefits
6. amenities, conveniences, psychological rewards and
working conditions
Stolzenberg and Winkler conclude their review of
civilian separation literature by emphasizing that job
comparison and the search for alternatives must account for
the above range of characteristics. By not doing so, one may
incorrectly attribute the decision to separate to a narrow
range of factors, and possibly achieve misleading results.
In addition to the work of Stolzenberg and
Winkler, Farkus [Ref. 3] applies civilian-oriented concepts
to determine how unmet expectations, changes in satisfaction,
and changes in organizational commitment relate to changes in
the intention to reenlist. Farkus relies heavily on research
conducted by L. W. Porter and R. M. Steers in 1973, published
under the title Organizational , Work, and Personal Factors
in EmployBB Turnover and Absenteeism. Porter and Steers found
a consistent relationship between job satisfaction and
employee turnover, and they explained this relationship in
terms of "met expectations". Simply, they found that if an
employee's expectations are met, he or she will experience job
satisfaction and tend to remain in the organization. The
opposite is true if expectations are unmet.
In addition to the application of met
expectations, Farkus uses the notion of organizational
commitment as a predictor of employee turnover. His use of
organizational commitment includes the acceptance of values
and goals of the organization, a willingness to exert high
effort on behalf of the organization, and a desire to remain
in the organization.
With the above concepts in mind, Farkus
administered questionnaires to a cohort of Navy enlisted
personnel over different points in their first term. His
analysis found that changes in job satisfaction and
organizational commitment resulted from a steady decline over
time in met expectations. His analysis also suggested that
changes in organizational commitment were a stronger
determinant of changes in the reenlistment intention than were
changes in job satisfaction.
Another area of civilian research is Herzberg'
s
two-factor theory, which focuses on the aspects of job
satisfaction [Ref . 4] . Herzberg found that certain factors
were associated with high satisfaction and others with
dissatisfaction. He referred to job content factors as
"satisfiers", which included such things as achievement,
recognition, advancement, and responsibility. He called the
job context factors "dissatisfiers", and these included
company policy, supervision, salary, and working conditions.
Herzberg proposed that jobs containing content
factors (satisfiers) will lead to job satisfaction; but their
absence will lead to neutrality or indifference. Conversely,
he suggested that a job containing many context factors will
lead to indifference; but their absence will lead to
dissatisfaction. Herzberg concluded that jobs should be
designed to include both context factors (to avoid
dissatisfaction) and content factors (to ensure satisfaction) .
While the intention to reenlist is not exactly
compar2±>le to the intention to remain in a civilian
organization, the studies discussed above are relevant to the
reenlistment decision. It is apparent from these works that
a wide range of factors influence one's decision to remain or
separate, as do the strength of organizational commitment and
changes in job satisfaction and met expectations.
b. Military Studies
Doering and Grissmer [Ref. 5] give a general
review of the methodologies employed by researchers who have
studied reenlistment behavior through 1984. With regard to
retention, they note that several studies have concluded that
retention rates are sensitive to both the present and expected
future value of compensation. They write:
The focus on pay research is partly understandable.
The cost of military compensation is quite visible;
therefore measurements as to its effectiveness are
constantly in demand. Pay is also easily observed and
frequently adjusted to meet short term manpower goals.
Data to track these pay changes and associated retention
decisions are very good and easily accessible. No special
data collection is required. It, thus, presents an
excellent opportunity for measurement of effects. [Ref.
5:p. 16]
Doering and Grissmer expand their review of
retention research by acknowledging that the effects of
compensation must be combined with other explanations of
retention. Using both administrative personnel data and
survey results, various studies have found a wide range of
variables that influence retention decisions among military
personnel. Additionally, most studies are longitudinal in
approach, linking an individual's reenlistment intention with
eventual reenlistment behavior. Doering and Grissmer suggest
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that statements of enlistment and reenlistment intentions
provide good predictions of both actions, and can lead to
policy-relevant analysis.
Mobley, Hand and Griffith [Ref. 6] reviewed 76
military studies that dealt with enlistment, reenlistment,
and/or the withdrawal process. The studies employed diverse
methodologies and data. Mobley et al . were able to classify
the studies according to the dominant independent variable
(e.g., economic, organization climate and practices, etc.)
and the resulting decision (e.g., reenlistment, separation).
The authors evaluated 11 categories of independent variables,
including: economic/incentives, organization practices,
organization climate, job content, satisfaction, intentions,
expectations, demographic/biographic, psychological, aptitude,
and performance [Ref. 6:p. 119].
A common theme discovered by Mobley et al . is that
the economic/ incentive category accounted for the most
variance among the independent variables. However, the
authors conclude that the reenlistment process is multivariate
in nature, and research must therefore include the broadest
possible spectrum of variables.
In their review, Mobley et al . mention a study
conducted by Carlisle [Ref. 6:p. 14], who examined 1,070
enlisted Marines in the telecommunications field. Carlisle
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used a difference in means test to compare those intending to
reenlist to those not intending to reenlist. Each Marine
rated several categories of intrinsic and extrinsic job
factors. The intrinsic factors include the work itself,
achievement, recognition, responsibility, and growth. The
extrinsic factors included working conditions, supervisors,
peers, policies, family and social life, and pay. Carlisle
found those intending to reenlist had positive perceptions of
the intrinsic factors, and no extrinsic factor affected their
intention to reenlist. Alternatively, those deciding not to
reenlist were primarily concerned with their dissatisfaction
with extrinsic factors.
Chow and Polich [Ref. 7] used a 1976 DoD survey
of 4,000 Army, Navy and Air Force personnel to determine the
factors influencing first-term reenlistment . Their study
focused on individuals in pay grades E-4 or higher who had
one year or less remaining on active duty.
Chow and Polich constructed a multivariate logit
model to predict reenlistment probability using such
explanatory variables as regular military compensation,
reenlistment bonuses, allowances, aspects of the military
environment, and demographic variables (such as education,
race, sex, AFQT category and occupational specialty) . Some
of their findings include the following:
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1. The survey respondents consistently overvalued their
compensation.
2. Those who perceived larger values of compensation were
more likely to reenlist.
3. There were higher reenlistment rates among females, non-
whites, those receiving higher bonus multiples, and
those with dependents living in government quarters.
4. There were lower reenlistment rates for personnel with
high school diplomas, with some college, and for those
who underestimated the value of their compensation.
The study by Chow and Polich emphasized that
reenlistment intention accurately predict reenlistment
behavior. By comparing a respondent's survey intention with
his or her personnel record one year later, the authors found
that for those who said there was a greater than 90 percent
chance of reenlisting, 89 percent actually did.
Finn [Ref. 8] used data from the 1985 DoD survey
of officer and enlisted personnel to predict the reenlistment
intentions of Marines in their first or second term. Finn
used a multivariate logit model with the following explanatory
variables: pay satisfaction, job satisfaction, predictive
adDility to find civilian employment, attitude toward the
military in meeting one's expectations, and satisfaction with
fatmily environment.
Finn found that job satisfaction was the most
significant variable affecting reenlistment behavior. He also
found that several factors were directly related to the
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likelihood of reenlistment . These included higher pay, higher
promotion, minority status, and being married. In addition,
he found that a person's gender could not be used to predict
reenlistment intention.
Fletcher and Giesler [Ref. 9] used data from the
Navy Occupational Task Analysis Program (NOTAP) survey to
relate the respondent's attitudes toward Navy working and
living conditions to reenlistment decisions. The authors
further identified the effects of these attitudes in providing
guidelines for allocation of quality of life program funds.
The respondents' occupations covered a range of technical and
non-technical jobs. The authors used factor analysis to
reduce the survey data from 67 NOTAP job satisfaction items
to the three factors of pay, quality of job, and quality of
military life. The quality of job factor included autonomy,
physical work environment, skill utilization, team effort and
relationships with peers, supervisors, and subordinates. The
quality of military life factor included deployment time,
housing, duty station, medical services, and ship
habitability
.
Fletcher and Giesler used the three factors along
with demographic variables in a trinomial logit model to
estimate the probability of separating, extending, or
reenlisting. Their results show that pay is consistently
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important in retaining first-term personnel, and the quality
of job factor affected the decisions for both first-termers
and careerists. The authors also found that the quality of
military life factor was identifiable with quality of life
programs, and related most directly with the retention of
career personnel.
Cavin [Ref . 10] used data from the 1985 DoD survey
of officer and enlisted personnel to determine the number of
dimensions of Marine satisfaction with military life. By
using factor analysis, the author was able to form three
factors from 18 survey questions that gauged the satisfaction
of respondents with different aspects of military life (e.g.,
personal freedom, assignment stability, pay and allowances,
medical and dental care, etc.). Cavin identified the three
factors as personal fulfillment in the military, military
family stability, and military compensation and benefits.
Cavin noted two important implications from his
study. First, because satisfaction can be related to three
factors, he suggested that different elements of human
behavior explain different aspects of individual dedication
to the service. Therefore, different models of behavior may
be appropriate. Second, the presence of three factors has
policy implications in terms of how best to allocate resources
to retain dedicated personnel. In addition, as Cavin writes,
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the results "suggest that economic factors are only part of
the retention story and that military personnel policies
bearing on family stability may be important as well" [Ref.
10:p. 8].
The study by Vernez and Zellman [Ref. 11] provides
a review of the factors influencing reenlistment and
separation decisions for military members with families. The
authors point out that the proportion of married military
members increases with years of service. The authors present
statistics showing that just five percent of enlisted Marines
are married at the time of entry. By comparison, 34 percent
are married between their third and fourth years of service.
Therefore, the authors write, family considerations might
become increasingly important as personnel reach the first-
term reenlistment decision. In addition, the authors state
that it is not enough to know whether military members and
their families are satisfied with military life. One must
also consider how their level of satisfaction compares to the
perceived level of satisfaction available to them in the
civilian sector.
Vernez and Zellman point out that service members
with spouses or with children are more likely to leave during
their first-term. Additionally, the authors highlight that
frequent relocation, lack of choice in duty station, and
16
frequent separations impact negatively on one's choice to
remain in the military.
This thesis relies heavily upon past research to
determine the factors influencing reenlistment or separation.
The studies presented in this portion of the literature review
provide a broad view of those factors. A continuing theme
throughout is that the choice to stay in or separate is a
combination of many factors, including compensation, job
satisfaction, and location stability. The final decision
obviously rests with the individual service member, based upon
the level of satisfaction, fulfillment of goals, and perceived
availcibility of options. The next section of the literature
review covers the role of reenlistment incentives in
influencing a service member' s decision to remain in the
military. It also discusses research dealing with the
effectiveness of retention incentives.
3 . Reenlistment Incentives
Weybrew [Ref. 12] discusses the effectiveness of
several Navy incentive programs in 1966. Although the
prograons are outdated, the background information he develops
is still relevant. Weybrew writes that the objective of
military incentive programs "is to maintain or improve the
manpower 'posture' both quantitatively and qualitatively"
[Ref. 12:p. 2]. In relation to this study, the objective of
17
reenlistment incentives is to get the right number of quality
personnel to reenlist in the right skill groups as a way of
balancing the force.
A primary theoretical issue discussed by Weybrew is
the concept of incentives as they relate to personal
motivation. The effectiveness of a given incentive depends
upon the perception or meaning the incentive has to the person
making the decision. He states that "the effectiveness of an
incentive program will be affected by the degree to which each
member of the population toward which the system is directed
perceives the incentives as meaningful, tangible and relevant"
[Ref . 12:p. 3]
.
Weybrew also relates the concept of incentive
effectiveness to the fulfillment of a hierarchy of primary
and secondary needs. He assumes that monetary incentives are
directed toward primary needs (food, clothes, housing) , and
these needs must be met first before secondary needs
(security, self-esteem, status affiliation and need
achievement) can be met. Therefore, an incentive (e.g.,
educational opportunity) aimed at achieving a secondary need
will be ineffective unless the individual is relatively sure
that primary needs will also be met.
Weybrew ends his discussion of motivational theory by
emphasizing "that a recruit, a reenlistee or a career officer
18
is a person with needs, motives, and perceptions and not
simply a retention statistic" [Ref. 12:p. 7]. Therefore,
incentives must be adaptable enough to meet the needs of the
broadest range of personnel. Weybrew suggests that incentive
programs with the most potential for maximizing first-term
reenlistments should address the areas of advancement and
educational opportunities, pay and allowances, and
satisfaction with duty.
Studies focusing on the effectiveness of reenlistment
incentives have invariably looked at the impact of the
Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program. Hosek, Fernandez,
and Grissmer [Ref. 13] offer a general outline of the utility
of the SRB Program. Five of their major points are listed
below: [Ref. 13:pp. 28-29]
1
.
Bonuses are probcibly more cost effective than across-
the-board pay increases because they can be targeted
toward particular skills.
2. Bonuses offer greater flexibility because they can be
adjusted among skill groups, and can help control
transitory shortages.
3. Bonuses counter long term imbalances because of their
continued payment to many skill groups over time.
4. Bonuses counter the effect of declining military pay and
civilian unemployment on retention in critical skills.
5. Bonuses lengthen the average term of commitment since
they are paid to personnel who reenlist for more than
three years. This, in turn, improves the military's




Hosek and Peterson [ref. 14] follow-up on the above
points by analyzing continuation rate data from fiscal 197 6
through fiscal 1981. Their purpose in studying this period
is to determine the impact of two methods of bonus payment,
installment and lump sum. They found that lump sum bonuses
are more cost-effective, at least at the first-term retention
point. This is true because a smaller lump sum payment has
the same impact on retention as a larger bonus paid out over
the term of reenlistment . The authors conclude by suggesting
a continuation and possible expansion of the SRB program.
They base this recommendation on the ability of bonuses "to
respond quickly to changes both in labor supply, such as those
created by economic and demographic cycles, and in labor
demand, such as those created by changes in weapons systems
or force deployment" [Ref. 14:p. 3].
Another study centering on the impact of SRBs on
retention is that of Cymrot [Ref. 15] . Cymrot looks
specifically at the Marine Corps, and begins by grouping over
350 Marine occupational specialties into 22 skill families,
assuming individuals in similar occupations have similar
responses to bonuses. He further divides the skill families
into three experience zones based on years of service.
Cymrot uses the Annualized Cost of Living (ACOL)




Cymrot states that the ACOL approach assumes
Marines make reenlistment decisions based on the comparison
between military and civilian monetary and psychic rewards.
The ACOL approach also allows Cymrot to introduce other
factors (i.e., civilian unemployment rate, net pay and
military rank) that have an indirect effect on the
relationship between bonuses and reenlistments.
The results of Cymrot' s study show there is a strong
statistical association between bonuses and reenlistments in
nearly all combinations of skill families and experience
zones. With his results, Cymrot is able to calculate
reenlistment rates under different bonus multiple levels and
economic conditions. He finds that increases in the
unemployment rate increased expected reenlistments, and that
higher-ranked personnel are more likely to reenlist than
lower-ranked personnel. Additionally, Cymrot' s study
indicates that suspensions of the SRB program due to fund
depletion resulted in decreased reenlistments.
Aside from studies dealing with bonuses, no research
was found that quantitatively addresses the impact of other
incentives on retention. However, the study by Doering and
Grissmer (discussed above) highlights the need to determine
the effectiveness of additional reenlistment incentives. They
note that enlistment experiments have been conducted to
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measure the effects of educational benefits and terms of
service. The authors propose that several different
incentives could be tested with relatively small sample sizes
(500 to 1,000 individuals) and yield statistically significant
results. They recommend the testing of incentives that
include pay, guaranteed location, tour length, and job
retraining. Additionally, the authors recommend testing
specific incentives at different reenlistment points.
The final study mentioning the use of reenlistment
incentives is by Jacobson and Thomason [Ref . 16] . The purpose
of their study is to determine the impact of permanent change
of station (PCS) orders on the earnings of a military wife and
the resulting effect on a husband's retention. The authors'
research of first-term Navy personnel estimates that overall
retention is reduced by nine percent because of relocation
lessening the earnings of wives. Based on these results, the
authors recommend as a reenlistment incentive the guarantee
to service members that no relocation will occur. They
indicate the incentive would be valuable to approximately 18
percent of the potential first-term reenlistees, but that
savings would occur from reduced accession, training, and PCS
moves .
Reenlistment incentives may be effective in retaining
the proper number of personnel with the right skills, but
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simple numbers should not be the only concern. The military
also wants the best quality personnel to stay. The next
section of the literature review discusses the issue of
quality, and its importance in a technically-oriented, highly
specialized military.
4 . Retention and Quality
The issue of quality was addressed eibove as it
pertains to standards of enlistment (measured by AFQT category
and high school graduation). Marcus [Ref. 17] uses AFQT
categories as standards of quality while addressing the effect
of SRB levels, unemployment, and pay on the quality of the
career force. He proposes that responsiveness to pay is
different for individuals with differing characteristics, and
that changes in pay or the national economy may have a
significant impact on the quality of personnel retained.
The research by Marcus shows that there are
substantial differences in the impact of pay and unemployment
across mental groups. He suggests that changes in pay and
unemployment have the most impact on the best people who are
more valuable to civilian employers. Therefore, the higher
quality people are less likely to reenlist at the end of their
first-term when faced with widening gaps between military and
civilian pay or reduced unemployment levels.
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An additional funding by Marcus that is relevant to
this study concerns the importance of advancement to the
reenlistment decision. He points out that promotion is a
targeted policy since those promoted are the best performers
and therefore more valuable. Marcus proposes that increasing
the advancement rate in undermanned skill groups would have
a substantial impact on retention and is targeted on the best
people.
Ward and Tan [Ref. 18] differ from previous research
in their measure of quality. Although AFQT score and high
school graduation indicate the quality of personnel at the
time of enlistment, the authors question whether these factors
are meaningful predictors of job performance. Ward and Tan
introduce into their analysis the factors of promotion speed
and rank attained (along with AFQT scores and education level)
to get a broader picture of quality at the first-term
reenlistment point.
Their research shows that the military retains much
better personnel in the career force than it loses. In
comparing the performance of those who reenlisted with those
who did not, the authors note those who reenlisted had the
highest performance and higher absolute military ability.
Ward and Tan also state that AFQT category and education level
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matter very little in predicting the "success" (as measured
by rank and speed of promotion) of the first-term enlistee.
Ward and Tan apply their findings to reenlistment
policy. According to the authors, guidelines on eligibility
to reenlist should not be heavily weighted toward AFQT
category or education achievement, and should allow waivers
of standards that vary by military occupation. Additionally,
they propose that rank attained at the end of the first term,
and perhaps the speed of promotion should be included in
reenlistment policy guidelines.
Binkin [Ref. 19] addresses the relationship between
military technology and manpower requirements. Binkin
balances two concepts against each other. First, with regard
to technology, technical jobs have grown to represent a larger
share of all jobs in the military, while the technical
complexity of specific jobs has also expanded. Second, with
regard to manpower, the shrinking youth population combined
with anticipated economic recovery may make it increasingly
more difficult for the military to enlist and retain the
proper aunount of qualified personnel.
Binkin addresses quality from the normal standards of
AFQT category and education level . He notes that because of
their declining abilities, a smaller proportion of the youth
population will be qualified for service if advances in
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technology bring a heavier concentration of technical jobs to
the military.
Binkin discusses whether advances in technology
increase or decrease the need for higher quality personnel.
He approaches this subject from the perspective of system
complexity, reliability, and maintainability. By presenting
recent examples of the introduction of technically-advanced
equipment, Binkin concludes that high technology increases
the need for smarter, more technically proficient personnel.
Binkin balances the issues of technology and manpower
by offering several policy options. With regard to equipment
technology he proposes that the military services procure less
complex, more reliable, and more easily maintained equipment.
At the same time, he discusses the possibilities of expanding
the roles of women and civilians. He also discusses the
retention of highly skilled personnel by diverting resources
used to retain semi- or unskilled personnel. Binkin suggests
using these resources for incentives to retain highly skilled
individuals. As a further hedge against technology and
manpower trends, Binkin advises the military to alter training
concepts by focusing more on on-the-job training and applying
new technologies to the training base.
Eitelberg [Ref . 20] echoes some of the above thoughts
in his study of aptitude trends in the military's C^I
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(command, control, communication, intelligence) specialties,
including electronics and computers. He points out that these
specialties have grown in technological complexity, and have
also grown as a portion of the overall force.
Eitelberg examines the aptitude test scores (as
measured by the AFQT) of three cohorts or enlisted personnel
assigned to C^I jobs. The cohorts include persons enlisting
in the military in 1972, 1977, and 1982. The results reveal
a consistently downward trend over time in the aptitude test
scores of those who remain in the military. From these
trends, he concludes that the military is losing many of its
smartest people from some of the most technical jobs.
Eitelberg states that although the mean percentile scores have
fallen, they are still well aLbove the national average. Yet,
a sxobstantial loss of talent is evident, and it could be
countered through more effective reenlistment programs.
In addition to the downward trends in aptitude,
Eitelberg identifies future considerations concerning manpower
and technology. Specifically, he states that:
The competition for bright people in technological
fields is intensifying as the available supply of
employees continues to shrink. Moreover, as the military
experiences technological growth, its demand for highly-
qualified members will likely expand. The net result
(assuming relatively stable force size) is that
proportionately fewer people from an already-declining
population will be qualified for a growing number of
military jobs. This suggests that any deterioration in
the quality of military manpower will be proportionately
greater in places where quality is needed most. [Ref.
20:p. 25]
5 . Conclusion
The literature review has built a foundation of topics
relevant to the study of reenlistment incentives. It began
by addressing the wide range of factors that influence
military and civilian personnel to leave or remain in an
organization. This was followed by a discussion of the role
of incentives, and a brief summary of several incentive-
specific studies. Finally, the literature review looked at
the relationship between retention and quality within an
increasingly technical and specialized military.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II provides background information in three
general areas. First, the criteria for reenlistment are
examined to determine their ability to ensure the retention
of quality Marines. Second, the reenlistment incentives
currently offered by the Marine Corps are presented. Lastly,
the concepts of enlisted force balance and occupational skill
criticality are addressed.
In Chapter III, critical MOSs are identified by examining
the assignment of SRB multiples from fiscal 1985 to the
present. Additionally, a methodology is presented for the
examination of data obtained through the USMC Enlisted
Separation Questionnaire.
In Chapter IV, data from the separation questionnaires
are analyzed using cross-tabulation and frequency
distributions. The data are examined according to demographic
characteristics and DoD occupational areas to determine the
primary reasons for first-term Marines (in critical MOSs) not
reenlisting.
The results of the analyses conducted in this study are
summarized in Chapter V. Additionally, conclusions are
presented that focus on the enlisted separation questionnaire
and current reenlistment incentives. Finally, recommendations




In the Marine Corps, the process of retaining highly
qualified enlisted personnel falls under the guidance of the
career planning program. Marine Corps Order P1040.31E [Ref.
21], the Career Planning and Development Guide, states that
the "retention of quality Marines will ensure the maintenance
of a career force which is composed of Marines who are capable
of making significant contributions to the overall
effectiveness of the Marine Corps." [Ref. 21 :p. 1-3] This
study draws on two phrases of this quote to present retention
background information.
The "retention of quality Marines" invokes the notion that
the Marine Corps is selective in keeping the best personnel.
The issue of quality, although never defined in the reference,
is addressed in this chapter by referring to the criteria for
reenlistment eligibility. These criteria should ensure that
only quality Marines (those who meet the criteria) will be
permitted to reenlist.
The same phrase, "retention of quality Marines," could be
viewed from the perspective that there are quality Marines
approaching the end of their enlistment and facing a
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reenlistment decision. By being "quality" Marines, they meet
the criteria, yet they are not all inclined towards
reenlistment. Some are undecided, while the others feel
strongly for or against reenlisting. This study views
reenlistment incentives as mechanisms for influencing those
who are undecided. It also views incentives as added benefits
to those who would reenlist even without the presence of the
incentives. For those who are strongly inclined to separate,
reenlistment incentives are viewed as being non-pertinent to
their decision process. In this chapter, the study presents
the first-term reenlistment incentives offered by the Marine
Corps. These incentives are also compared to those offered
by the U.S. Army, as outlined in Army Regulation 601-280.
[Ref. 22]
Another portion of the above quote (from the Career
Planning and Development Guide) concerns "the maintenance of
a career force". This study assumes that the phrase refers
to the enlisted ranks, beyond the first-term, as being
balanced by rank, experience, and skill. However, quality
first-term Marines are those the Marine Corps wants to
transfer into the career force. Therefore, maintaining
balance in the career force begins with retaining those in
their first-term who possess the skills deemed critical by
enlisted manpower planners. The concepts of enlisted force
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balance and occupational skill criticality are the final
background issues discussed in this chapter.
B. REENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
As previously noted, the criteria for reenlistment should
provide a guarantee for maintaining a high quality enlisted
force beyond the first-term. The majority of criteria apply
to all enlisted Marines, whether first-term or beyond.
Additional criteria apply only to first-term reenlistment.
Moreover, all unmet criteria may be waived at different levels
in the chain of command. This study excimines the reenlistment
criteria by categorizing them into one of three groups.
The first reenlistment criteria group involves individual
character and other personal traits. This group includes the
following five prerequisites; [Ref. 21:pp. 3-5 to 3-6]
1. Possess high standards of leadership, professional
competence, and personal behavior required to maintain
the prestige and quality standards of the Marine Corps.
2. Possess the moral character and personal integrity
expected of all Marines.
3. Not be a conscientious objector.
4. Not be a sole surviving son or daughter.
5. Be recommended by the commanding officer.
The first two of these criteria appear so grandiose in
wording that they refer more to the collective character of
the Marine Corps than they do to the individual Marine. As
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such, these criteria have little impact in determining whether
a Marine is qualified to reenlist. The third prerequisite has
less impact since a conscientious objector is not likely to
voluntarily join an organization renowned for its warfighting
capacity and probable early commitment in any size scale of
conflict. Likewise, restricting enlistment or reenlistment
from a sole-surviving son or daughter can be easily waived,
and seems more appropriate under draft conditions during a
large-scale conflict than under volunteer conditions of a
peacetime force. The final character criterion is the most
basic in that it introduces the element of judgment by the
chain of command. However, a commander must base his judgment
concerning the worthiness of a prospective reenlistee on some
tangible evidence. This evidence can be found in the second
and third categories of reenlistment criteria.
The second category of reenlistment criteria can be
described as performance-related. Included in this category
are the following six prerequisites:
1. Pass the physical fitness test and meet military
appearance and height/weight standards.
2. Have a minimum conduct and proficiency average of
4.0/4.0 (explained below).
3. Have successfully completed a twelfth grade education
or its equivalent.
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4. Have a general technical (GT) aptitude area score of 80
for a high school graduate or 95 for a non-high school
graduate.
5. Pass a physical examination to be fully qualified for
all duties at sea and in the field.
6. Meet the necessary time-in-service requirements. Most
often, this means that a Marine has less than one year
remaining on his or her current reenlistment contract.
Three of the above prerequisites may be waived at the
Commanding General's level for first-term Marines. These
include education level, general aptitude, and performance
rating. These three prerequisites are the most directly
related to standards of quality discussed in Chapter I. As
previously noted, in recent years virtually all Marine
recruits have been high school graduates. Furthermore, the
few new recruits who do not possess a high school diploma at
enlistment are strongly encouraged to obtain an equivalency
diploma during their first term. The criterion for
educational level is therefore meaningless by today's
standards. Concerning aptitude, the requirement for a GT
score of 80 for high school graduates is not particularly
restrictive. In fact, studies have suggested that this score
can be achieved by at least 72 percent of the general
population.^ Additionally, a Marine who scored poorly on the
^Eitelberg, M. J., Manpower for Military Occupations, p. 235,
April 1988.
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entrance examination may retake any portion to improve his or
her scores to qualify for reenlistment or other selective
training programs. The final performance-related criterion
that can be waived by a commanding general pertains to
proficiency and conduct ratings. Without going into the
specific rating guidelines, a mark below the 4.0 level for
either area normally identifies a Marine needing too much job
supervision (proficiency) or having disciplinary problems
(conduct) . Considering that over a typical four-year
enlistment, a Marine will receive many marks from different
supervisors, average marks of below 4.0/4.0 signal a marginal-
to-poor performer. In all, the performance-related criteria
are not particularly restrictive, and are less so when
allowing the three that are most related to standards of
quality to be waived.
The final category of reenlistment criteria is punitive-
related, and includes the following six prerequisites:
1. Not have a record of military involvement in the
wrongful use, possession, distribution, or introduction
for the purpose of distribution on a military
installation of any narcotic substance or dangerous drug
(including marijuana)
.
2. Have no conviction by a court-martial.
3. Have no known convictions by civil authorities, or
action taken which is tantamount to a finding of guilty
of an offense for which the maximum penalty under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice is confinement for six
months or more and/or a fine of $500 or more.
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4. Have no more than two nonjudicial punishments.
5. Not have completed formal alcohol treatment during the
past year. (Marines may be extended for up to one year.
This restriction does not apply to Marines who volunteer




6. Have completed an unscheduled urinalysis within 90 days
prior to reenlistment
.
As previously observed, the Services have learned that
higher-quality enlistees generally experience fewer
disciplinary problems. Additionally, the urinalysis testing
program, currently used by all Services, has resulted in a
steady decline through the 1980s in the number of drug-
related incidents. As such, these criteria set forth
minimally-accepted standards of conduct. A Marine who
breaches one of these criteria will receive reduced marks for
conduct and possibly even proficiency. Moreover, as with most
reenlistment criteria, a commanding general may waive the
prerequisites for first-term Marines that deal with illegal
drugs, civilian convictions, court-martials, and nonjudicial
punishments.
The majority of all enlistment criteria, particularly
those related to performance and punitive standards, establish
minimally accepted standards. As such, the criteria seem to
allow the reenlistment of Marines who can meet only the
minimum standards. Additionally, by permitting many of the
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criteria to be waived, the Marine Corps provides reenlistment
opportunities to Marines who do not meet all minimum
standards. The overriding presence of the waiver process
appears to give the Marine Corps the flexibility to reenlist
marginal personnel, likely during difficult periods of
recruiting or retention. As noted by Doering and Grissmer,
the flexibility in the reenlistment criteria may allow the
retention of marginal personnel if the alternatives are vacant
billets and unmet retention goals. [Ref. 5:p. 2]
C. FIRST-TERM REENLISTMENT INCENTIVES
Chapter Four of the Marine Corps Career Planning and
Development Guide outlines the incentives available to first-
term Marines who are eligible to reenlist. The chapter begins
by stating that "incentives are offered to afford qualified
Marines who are sincerely oriented towards a Marine Corps
career an opportunity to influence their future". [Ref. 21 :p.
4-3] With regard to first-term Marines, those decided to
reenlist after having served approximately four years have
likely not made the reenlistment decision with a long-term,
20-year career in mind. More likely, they have considered the
ability of the Marine Corps to meet their expectations, their
opportunity to pursue perceived alternatives, and their
overall satisfaction with a wide range of factors.
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This study consequently considers the first-term
reenlistment decision to be of shorter term, lasting for the
length of the reenlistment contract. Also, the quote in the
above paragraph focuses on the ability of incentives to allow
reenlisting Marines to shape and influence their future. This
concept relates more to the Marine who is certain of
reenlisting. However, for those who are undecided, the
incentives should influence their reenlistment decisions in
that incentives must be meaningful and pertinent to the
individual contemplating reenlistment. It is unlikely that
the incentive with the most quantifiable impact on
reenlistment, the Selective Reenlistment Bonus, or SRB, could
be categorized as allowing a Marine to shape his or her Marine
Corps career. Receiving an SRB may influence one's lifestyle,
and it may shape one's career only to the extent that by
receiving a bonus, a Marine will stay in.
The SRB has been the most widely studied incentive, and
guidance for its use is the most detailed of all the
incentives. The guidance begins in Title 37 of the United
States Code, paragraph 308. [Ref. 23:pp. 214-216] Six major
points to be drawn from Title 37 are as follows:
1. It requires an individual to be qualified in a military
skill designated as critical.
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2. It establishes the method of bonus formulation; (SRB
multiple) * (one month's basic pay) * (number of years
reenlisted)
. (The SRB multiple is explained below.)
3. It sets the maximum multiple of six, the maximum number
of years of reenlistment as six, and the maximum bonus
at $30,000.
4. It states that, of the total new bonuses paid during a
fiscal year, not more than ten percent may exceed
$20,000.
5. It requires an individual to reenlist for more than
three years
.
6. It allows the payment of bonuses either in a lump sum
or installments.
The SRB multiple is a number between zero and six. Its
value is assigned to every enlisted military occupation by
manpower planners for each of the Services. A higher multiple
indicates a more critical occupation and thus a higher bonus.
In addition to varying by occupation, multiples also vary by
three experience zones: Zone A for first-term reenlistees.
Zone B for second-term reenlistees, and Zone C for careerists
with no more than 14 years of service. Finally, multiples are
changed frequently by manpower planners to manage the size and
experience levels of their respective Services. As noted by
Cymrot, the Marine Corps changed the SRB multiples 21 times
between October 1979 and December 1985 [Ref. 15:pp. 4-5].
The above guidelines are further refined in Department of
Defense (DoD) Instruction 1304.22, dated 7 August 1985 [Ref.
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24] . The major refinements from this instruction include the
following four points:
1. It established three zones of SRB eligibility depending
on total years of service. Zone A generally pertains to
first-termers, Zone B to intermediates or second-
termers, and Zone C to careerists.
2. It stipulates the criteria for designating an
occupational specialty as critical. (These criteria are
outlined below along with the concept of force balance.)
3. It further defines criteria for individual member
eligibility, such as being in pay grade E-3 or above.
4. It states that the purpose of the SRB is to induce
individuals serving in a critical skill to reenlist and
serve in the skill for the full period for which the
bonus is paid.
The maintenance of the SRB program is further refined at
the level of the Secretary of the Navy and Commandant of the
Marine Corps. The Marine Corps incorporates three additional
points to the program. First, the Marine Corps requires an
individual to reenlist for a minimum of four years, not three.
Next, the method of payment is required to be 50 percent of
the total bonus at the time of reenlistment, with the
remaining portion paid in equal amounts on the reenlistment
anniversary dates. Finally, the Marine Corps sets the maximum
multiple at five, not six.
As can be seen above, although Title 37 of the U.S. Code
establishes basic guidelines, the SRB program faces many
refinements before arriving at the individual service level.
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Additionally, each Service may administer the program
differently from the others. For example, the Army has
recently added two refinements. [Ref. 25] First, the Army
allows multiples to increase by half values between one half
and six (0.5, 1, 1.5, etc.) . This may provide the Army with
more accuracy in targeting the necessary number of
reenlistments in each critical specialty, given a change in
the SRB multiple. Second, the Army now links the SRB multiple
to not only occupational specialty and zone, but also to
grade. For example, an E-5 may receive a larger multiple than
an E-4 even though they are both first-termers with the same
occupational specialty. This may help to retain personnel of
higher quality if quality is gauged by rank attained and speed
of promotion, as suggested by Ward and Tan [Ref. 18]. In
1985, the Marine Corps similarly tied an SRB multiple of one
to occupational specialty and rank. In that year, first-term
Marines in several combat arms specialties (rifleman,
machinegunner, mortarman, assaultman, and field artillery
cannoneer) qualified for a bonus only if they were in pay
grades E-4 or E-5.
In addition to the SRB, the Marine Corps offers
reenlistees a choice of assignment preference to a duty
station, a type of duty, or a location where a requirement
and billet vacancy exist for their grade and occupational
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specialty. With regard to a particular duty station, Marines
may request three preferences for assignment. The preferences
may be in the continental United States (CONUS) or overseas
(normally Okinawa, Japan) , or the Marine may request to remain
at his or her present location for up to 12 months. In
general, the individual's assignment preferences must match
the Marine Corps' requirements for grade and skill vacancies.
The request for a specific type of duty involves training
for an assignment to a duty that is outside of a Marine's
primary occupational specialty. Examples of these duty
assignments are Marine security guard (barracks)
,
recruiting,
and drill instructor duties. These assignments require the
Marine to meet strict screening criteria. Additionally,
reenlistment is not the only occasion when these special
duties may be requested. If a Marine meets the screening
criteria, he or she may request special duty at any time. It
is beyond the scope of this study to address the likelihood
of a Marine requesting and eventually being assigned to
special duty. However, special duty billets are extremely
competitive, not only for initial assignment to training, but
also to complete training.
The Army offers reenlistment incentives for choice of duty
station or type of duty based upon the same general theme as
the Marine Corps--that is, the individual's qualifications and
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the needs of the Army. Some of the Army's options are
basically identical to those of the Marine Corps, such as
remaining at one's present location for up to 12 months, or
requesting an assignment either in CONUS or overseas. Type
of duty incentives are also similar to the Marine Corps in
that they are extremely competitive. These include assignment
to the Berlin Brigade or to the Army's ceremonial "Old Guard"
(the Third Infantry in Washington, D. C). Other options
offered by the Army appear broader in scope. For example, a
reenlisting soldier may request assignment to a particular
unit down to the regimental level. Also, some of the
incentives involving type of duty seem to expand the soldier' s
opportunities within his or her primary occupational
specialty. These include the possibility of airborne or
ranger training, with the subsequent assignment to a unit
requiring those skills.
The Marine Corps offers career progression training as
the third type of reenlistment incentive. This type of
training is normally within a Marine's primary occupational
specialty, and it exposes the Marine to advanced level courses
based on the needs of the Marine Corps and the availability
of formal school quotas. Reenlistment is not the sole
occasion for assignment to career progression training.
However, this type of training is set aside for Marines who
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have a solid record of performance and will remain on active
duty for a specific amount of time (at least 12 months,
normally) following completion of the training. The Army
offers similar advanced training to reenlistees.
Additionally, the Army offers foreign language training at
the Defense Language Institute. As with airborne and ranger
training, language training expands the soldier'
s
opportunities within his or her primary specialty.
The final type of reenlistment incentive offered by the
Marine Corps is lateral movement to another occupational
specialty. Lateral movement may occur if an individual is in
a specialty that is overstrength and qualifies for training
in an understrength specialty. As with other reenlistment
incentives, lateral movement does not have to occur at the
point of reenlistment. Moreover, lateral movement is a method
used more by manpower planners to balance the force than it
is as a reenlistment incentive [Ref . 26] . The issue of a
balanced force and the designating of an occupation as
"critical" are addressed below.
D. FORCE BAIiANCB AMD OCCUPATION CRITICALITY
The issue of balancing the Marine Corps' enlisted force
involves several factors. Among these factors are overall
end-strength, occupational specialties, years of service.
rank, attrition, recruitment, and retention. Because this
study focuses on reenlistment incentives and their impact on
first-term retention, this section initially addresses the
process of setting reenlistment goals. It then examines how
these goals are adjusted when balanced against end-strength
and occupational specialty requirements. The information for
this section was provided by the Enlisted Plans Section of the
Manpower Policy and Plans Division at HQMC.
The setting of reenlistment goals begins with an estimate
of what the career planning force can expect to achieve. The
estimate comes from the Enlisted Force Management System,
which applies forecasted losses to the current personnel
inventory. The system then compares the forecasted inventory
by occupational specialty and zone (based upon years of
service) to the overall target inventory for the enlisted
force. The system calculates retention rates for each
specialty and zone based on recent historical behavior from
the past year. It then applies the rates against the
population of Marines who will reach the end of their service
contracts in the targeted fiscal year. This produces an
estimate of how reenlistments can contribute towards balancing
the enlisted force. After review by the enlisted assignment
monitors and the Enlisted Retention Section, the estimate
becomes the reenlistment plan for a given fiscal year.
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The execution of the reenlistment plan is monitored by
the Enlisted Retention Section. This section determines on
a monthly basis whether the reenlistment goals are achievable.
If not, the entire enlisted manpower plan must be changed to
reflect more realistic goals. Every change to the manpower
plan requires the approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs at HQMC. For example, two
changes to the plan in fiscal 198 9 reduced the overall
reenlistment goal by over 1,400 reenlistments
.
Changes to the reenlistment goals may occur when goals
are not being met for specific occupational specialties. This
can affect the skill balance within the force. However,
achieving an end-strength figure is more critical than
balancing the force by skills. Thus, not achieving a
retention goal in one specialty may result in retaining more
personnel than required in other specialties. Exceeding a
specialty's retention goal is limited by the policy that
prohibits first-term reenlistment into an overmanned
specialty.
Similarly, as with occupational specialties, personnel
experience (years of service) also contributes towards
balancing the force. If balance and end- strength cannot both
be met, balance will be sacrificed to achieve end-strength.
Therefore, the inability to meet first-term reenlistment goals
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can lead to an increase in intermediate and career goals. For
example, during fiscal 1988 and fiscal 1989, shortfalls in
first-term reenlistments were counteracted by over-execution
of intermediate and career goals.
The achievement of a balanced enlisted force by skill and
experience is secondary in importance to meeting end-strength
requirements. However, other factors besides reenlistment
plans affect the attainment of an end-strength. For instance,
recruitment plans and separation policies can contribute to
short-term achievement of an end-strength. To address the
long-term effectiveness of a force, one must consider balance
by skill and experience. The dependence of the Services on
the SRB to encourage retention of personnel having critical
skills confirms the need for this type of balance.
As mentioned earlier, the SRB is offered to individuals
in specialties that meet specific criteria for being
designated as "critical". DoD Instruction 1340.22 [Ref. 24]
outlines the requirements for designating these occupational
specialties. The criteria include the following:
1. Serious undermanning in a number of adjacent year
groups
.
2. Chronic and persistent shortages in total career manning
in past years or projected for future years.
3. High replacement cost, including training costs.
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4. Skill is relatively arduous or otherwise unattractive
compared to other military skills or civilian
occupations
.
5. Skill is essential to the accomplishment of the Service
missions
.
The selection of "critical" occupations requires a
balanced evaluation of the above criteria. Although the DoD
Instruction outlines the criteria, each Service must apply
the guidelines to their respective force to determine the
critical specialties. The Marine Corps, for example,
considers a skill critical when it is manned by less than 95
percent of the billet requirement. Additionally, each service
must equally consider the amount of money allocated for
expenditures on SRBs . Based on the above DoD guidelines, most
specialties would likely be considered "critical".
E. CONCLUSION
This chapter began by presenting the first-term
reenlistment criteria currently used by the Marine Corps.
These criteria are fairly unrestrictive in allowing the
possible reenlistment of marginal personnel. Current
reenlistment incentives were covered next. In addition to
the SRB, the incentives offered by the Marine Corps are choice
of duty and duty station, career progression training, and
lateral movement into an understrength MOS . The SRB is
strictly controlled at many different administrative levels
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within the Department of Defense. The other incentives are
specific to the Marine Corps, and available at other times
besides the point of reenlistment . The final areas covered
in this chapter were enlisted force balance and skill
criticality. Total force end-strength overrides force balance
based on skills and experience, while skill criticality
appears equally controlled by allocated SRB funds, and by DoD
and Service guidelines.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter consists of two sections. In the first
section, critical military occupational specialties (MOSs) in
the Marine Corps are identified. These MOSs were selected by
examining the SRB multiples assigned by HQMC from fiscal 1985
to the present. The second section focuses on data obtained
through the USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire.
B. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL SPECIALTIES
The focus of this study is on Marine occupational
specialties that have been critically short from fiscal 1985
to the present. The initial step is to obtain data and
develop a methodology for identifying the critical skills.
Identification of critical skills was originally requested
from the Enlisted Plans Section of the Manpower Policy and
Plans Division at HQMC. Specifically, the author requested
that critical specialties be identified according to annual
retention goals for each specialty, with the corresponding
success rate in meeting each goal. As it turned out, this
information was not retained by HQMC during the time period
studied here, and was therefore unavailable. As an
alternative, it was recommended that this study examine the
assignment of SRB multiples from fiscal 1985 to present. As
noted in the previous chapter, an MOS must first be designated
as critical before it can be assigned an SRB multiple.
Therefore, it is assumed that an examiination of SRB multiples
can reveal which MOSs are considered critical. As a result,
seven messages were examined that assigned SRB multiples to
Marine Corps MOSs. The seven messages with their
corresponding message designation and fiscal year appear
below.
1. ALMAR 268/84 for fiscal 1985 [Ref. 27]
2. ALMAR 260/85 for fiscal 1986 [Ref. 28]
3. ALMAR 264/86 for fiscal 1987 [Ref. 29]
4. ALMAR 329/87 for fiscal 1988 [Ref. 30]
5. ALMAR 260/88 for fiscal 1989 [Ref. 31]
6. ALMAR 101/89 to update fiscal 1989 [Ref. 32]
7. ALMAR 165/89 for fiscal 1990 [Ref. 33]
The messages identify the occupational specialties by
their four digit codes, with corresponding multiples for each
of the three zones (A, B, or C) . This study deals only with
the zone A multiples for first-term Marines. Additionally,
this study examines only those specialties that existed from
1985 to the present. For instance, several specialties that
rated multiples on the first three messages were deleted and
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reassigned between 1985 and 1987 due to enlisted skills
reorganization. As a result, 23 specialties were eliminated
from further study. Also excluded from further study are
specialties designated for Marines not yet occupationally
qualified (that is, trainees) and those designated for Marines
of pay grade E-6 and above. In all, 291 enlisted occupational
specialties existed over the entire period and rated at least
one SRB multiple.
Two interesting trends appear in the assignment of SRB
multiples. First, the number of specialties rating an SRB
has declined by more than half from fiscal 1985 to present;
235 in fiscal 1985, down to 116 for fiscal 1990 (see Figure
1) . Second, the average multiple has been increasing, from
3.27 in fiscal 1985 to 4.10 for fiscal 1990 (see Figure 2).
From these trends it appears that the Marine Corps has become
more selective in using the SRB as a reenlistment incentive.
This selectivity may be partly due to generally less money
being appropriated to the Marine Corps for new SRB payments
during the same period. According to the Enlisted Plans
Section, the Marine Corps received $51.8 million in fiscal




Note: The above values were obtained by summing the number
of MOSs awarded an SRB for each fiscal year. 1989-
1 indicates the initial SRB program for fiscal 1989
(ALMAR 260/88) . 1989-2 reflects an update of the
fiscal 1989 SRB program (ALMAR 101/89)
Source: ALMAR 268/84, ALMAR 260/85, ALMAR 264/86, ALMAR
329/87, ALMAR 260/88, ALMAR 101/89, and ALMAR 165/89.
Figure 1. No. of MOSs Awarded an SRB by Fiscal Year
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Fiscal Year
Note: The average multiple was found by summing all
multiples and dividing by the number of eligible MOSs
for each fiscal year. 1989-1 indicates the initial
SRB program for fiscal 1989 (ALMAR 260/88) . 1989-2
reflects an update of the fiscal 1989 SRB program
(ALMAR 101/89) .
Source: ALMAR 268/84, ALMAR 260/85, ALMAR 264/86, ALMAR
329/87, ALMAR 260/88, ALMAR 101/89, and ALMAR 165/89.
Figure 2. Average SRB Multiple by Fiscal Year
As mentioned earlier, the assignment of an SRB denotes a
specialty as critical. However, this study sought to
distinguish those specialties that have received the highest
multiples over the entire time frame. Therefore, a
methodology, based on specific criteria, was needed to
identify the critical specialties by using SRB multiples.
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The following two criteria were consequently applied in
selecting "critical" MOSs for this study:
1
.
The average SRB multiple for the critical MOS over the
entire period was two or greater; and
2. The critical MOS was awarded a multiple on the seven
selected messages at least four times.
In addition to the two above criteria, if a specialty were
in a Marine occupational field in which the majority of
specialties met the first two criteria, it was considered
critical. (Note: An occupational field is a general
classification, such as intelligence or logistics. There are
3 6 Marine occupational fields, each of which is subdivided
into individual military occupational specialties.) This last
criterion was added to ensure the inclusion of specialties
that require skills similar to those of the entire
occupational field.
By following the above criteria, this study identified
177 specialties out of 415 as "critical". Many of the
critical specialties fall within occupational fields where
all the specialties in the field are critical. Examples of
these fields are intelligence, signal intelligence/ground
electronic warfare, and electronics maintenance.
Appendix A lists the critical specialties arranged by the
Department of Defense (DoD) Occupational Conversion Manual
[Ref. 34]. By using this system, the data base is divided
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into the following eight occupational areas (instead of the
36 Marine occupational fields)
:
1. - Infantry, Gun Crews and Seconanship Specialists
2. 1 - Electronic Equipment Repairers
3. 2 - Communications and Intelligence Specialists
4. 4 - Other Technical and Allied Specialists
5. 5 - Functional Support and Administration
6. 6 - Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers
7. 7 - Craftsman
8
.
8 - Service and Supply Handlers
Occupational areas three (Medical and Dental Specialists)
and nine (Nonoccupational) were not relevant to this study.
The DoD classification system is used because it groups
specialties together that are similar in their occupational
requirements. Furthermore, this study uses the DoD system as
a basis for analysis of the separation questionnaires.
C. USMC ENLISTED SEPARATION QUESTIONNAIRE
The separation questionnaire data for this study were
provided by the Manpower Analysis Branch of the Manpower
Policy and Plans Division. The data base contains enlisted
personnel only, and includes not only survey responses but
also information about the demographic background of the
respondents (e.g., pay grade, MOS, education level, etc.).
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Additionally, the data were collected between fiscal 1985 and
the third quarter of fiscal 1989. The questionnaire data base
initially contained 38,904 observations and 76 variables for
each observation.
The data base was condensed to 19,485 observations to
eliminate data based on term of service and reenlistment code.
Survey data were retained on individuals completing their
first term of service and on those who had been assigned a
reenlistment code indicating they were eligible and
recommended for reenlistment. Additionally, suirvey data were
deleted for individuals of grade E-1 or E-2 . This was done
as an added guarantee that observations would be retained on
Marines who where completing their first term of service and
had not experienced any disciplinary problems.
The final step in condensing the data base required the
extraction of observations from Marines assigned to critical
specialties. This step reduced the data base from 19,485 to
4,857 observations. The resulting data base did not include
questionnaire observations from Marines representing 29
critical specialties. As a result, 148 critical specialties,
not 177, are represented by the survey data.
In addition to being arranged by DoD occupational area,
the 4,857 observations were arranged by demographic variables
accounting for marital status, race, gender, and pay grade.
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The marital status variable had seven possible markings:
married, divorced, widowed, separated, single, annulled, and
pending final divorce. This study combined married,
separated, and pending final divorce into the "married"
category. The remaining observations comprised the "single"
category. This grouping produced 32.7 percent "married" and
67.3 percent "single". These percentages are in line with
statistics mentioned in the literature review (stating that
approximately 35 percent of Marines near the end of their
first-term are married) . The race variable had six possible
markings: white, black, yellow, red, other, or unknown. The
white respondents were placed into one group, and all others
into a "minority" category. This grouping produced 8 6.4
percent white, and 13.6 percent minority. The pay grade
variable had four possible categories: E-3, E-4, E-5, and E-
6. There were five observations from Marines in grade E-6.
These were combined with the E-5 observations, and the E-3 and
E-4 categories remained unchanged. As a result, the data base
contained 19.1 percent E-3s, 67.2 percent E-4s, and 13.7
percent E-5s.
Tables 1 and 2 display the above demographic variables
for all observations, arranged by DoD occupational areas.
Information in Table 1 includes number and percentage of
observations represented by each occupational area, average
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TABLE 1. DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE POPULATION BY DOD
OCCUPATIONAL AREA, GENERAL TECHNICAL SCORE, AND
PAY GRADE
OCCUPATIONAL AREAS NO. OF % OF AVG GT PAY GRADE
DBS SAMPLE SCORE E-3 E-4 E-5
Infantry & Gun
Crews 91 1.9 107.9 33.0 56.0 11.0
1 Electronic Equipment
Repairers 1,097 22.6 116.7 13.9 60.9 25.2
2 Comm & Intelligence
Specialists 230 4.7 119.6 14.3 59.1 26.6
4 Technical & Allied
Specialists 72 1.5 111.8 6.9 68.1 25.0
5 Functional Support
& Administration 505 10.4 106.4 21.8 68.1 10.1
6 a. Elec/Mech Equip Rprs
(Aircraft related) 1,213 25.0 108.2 18.8 71.6 9.6
b. Elec/Mech Equip Rprs
(Non-Aircraft rel) 1,143 23.5 104.2 22.0 68.7 9.4
7 Craftsmen 314 6.5 101.5 20.4 71.0 8.6
8 Service & Supply
Handlers 192 3.9 102.8 26.6 71.8 1.6
4,857 100.0 108.9 19.1 67.2 13.7
Note: The above values reflect only the composition of the
data used in this study. They are not meant to
represent the Marine Corps as a whole. The sample
population consists of first-term Marines in critical
MOSs.
Source : USMC Enlisted. Separatxon Quest lonnaxre, collected
between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of 1989, and
DoD Occupational Conversion Manual, Jan 1989.
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TABLE 2. DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE POPULATION BY DOD
OCCUPATIONAL AREA, MARITAL STATUS, GENDER, AND
RACE
OCCUPATIONAL AREAS MARITAL STATUS GENDER RACE
Married Single Male Female White Minori
Infantry & Gun
Crews 39.6 60.4 100.0 - 75.8 24.:
1 Electronic Equipment
Repairers 30.1 69.9 95.9 4.1 92.0 8.
2 Comm & Intelligence
Specialists 38.7 61.3 92.2 7.8 93.5 6.
4 Technical & Allied
Specialists 41.7 58.3 100.0 - 91.7 8.,
5 Functional Support
& Administration 34.1 65.9 82.0 18.0 72.9 27..
6 a. Elec/Mech Equip Rprs
(Aircraft related) 33.5 66.5 98.7 1.3 89.3 10.,
b. Elec/Mech Equip Rprs
(Non-Aircraft rel) 33.4 66.6 96.2 3.8 83.7 16.
7 Craftsmen 33.8 66.2 94.3 5.7 84.1 15.
8 Service & Supply
Handlers 28.1 71.9 99.0 1.0 85.9 14.
ALL 32.7 67.3 95.2 4.8 86.4 13
Note: The above values reflect only the composition of the
data used in this study. They are not meant to
represent the Marine Corps as a whole. The sample
population consists of first-term Marines in critical
MOSs.
Source: USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected
between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of 1989,
and DoD Occupational Conversion Manual, Jan 1989.
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GT score, and pay grade distribution. While not a measure of
intelligence, GT score is a measure of aptitude and
trainability, and is included to show variation between the
different occupational areas. TcdDle 2 displays the
distribution of the remaining demographic variables (marital
status, gender, and race)
.
There is wide variation in the representativeness between
occupational areas. For instance, the electronic/mechanical
equipment repairers comprise almost half of the observations,
while the technical and allied specialists make up less than
two percent. As a result, the electronic/mechanical equipment
repairers were further divided into aircraft and non-aircraft
related groups. This caused a more equal distribution of
occupational area six. The remaining percentages simply
describe the data base, and are not meant to be representative
of the Marine Corps on the whole.
Three assumptions were made in analyzing the separation
questionnaires. Doering and Grissmer state that exit surveys
have been plagued with poor response rates, and that low
response is subject to problems of bias [Ref. 5:p. 48]. The
Marine Corps enlisted separation questionnaire has a response
rate of approximately 35 percent. Therefore, it is assumed
that the data are biased to the extent that they reflect only
the opinion of those Marines in critical specialties who chose
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to respond; and no broad generalizations should be drawn for
all Marines who separated during the period studied here.
The second assumption is that the Marines who responded
to the questionnaire are voluntarily separating at the end of
their first enlistment contract. This is in contrast to
involuntary separation in which a service member is processed
for discharge by his or her command for reasons of
unsuitability (such as medical or punitive reasons) . The
steps mentioned above to condense the data based on favoraODle
reenlistment code ensure that the observations to be analyzed
are from Marines voluntarily separating.
The final assumption concerns the ability of the
questionnaire to accurately portray an individual's reasons
for not reenlisting. Doering and Grissmer state that most
exit surveys tend to focus on the "push" factors (the
military-related factors that push an individual out of the
military) , as opposed to "pull" factors (the civilian-related
factors that pull an individual into the civilian sector)
.
[Ref. 5:p. 32] The Marine Corps Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire similarly focuses on "push" factors. Therefore,
this study assumes that the questionnaire enables the
respondents to indicate only the military-related factors for
not reenlisting.
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The questionnaire is displayed in Appendix B. The sixth
section of the questionnaire, which lists the 34 military-
related reasons for not reenlisting, provides the data for
analysis. The questionnaire responses were initially analyzed
based upon their mean average values and associated standard
deviations for the entire sample. Within the data base, each
questionnaire response is assigned a value between one and
five in Part A of Section 6. The values correspond to the
five degrees of importance that a respondent may assign to
each response. The values are coded in the data base in the
following manner:
1. 1 "Extremely Important"
2. 2 "Very Important"
3. 3 "Important"
4. 4 "Of Some Importance"
5. 5 "Not Very Important or of No Importance"
For this study, the values were receded in reverse order
(i.e., a value of "5" was assigned to "extremely important",
a value of "4" to "very important", and so on) . The
questionnaire responses, with their respective mean average
values and standard deviations, are displayed in Table 3 in
the order that they appear on the questionnaire.
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TABLE 3. MEAN VALUES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF USMC
ENLISTED SEPARATION QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE
No. Reason for Not Reenlisting
1 Dislike physical fitness standards
2 Too many petty regulations
3 Assigned work doesn't use educational skills
4 Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor
5 Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want
6 Pay and allowances are too low
7 Lack of recognition for doing a good job
8 Fear of losing retirement benefits
9 Too many permanent change of station moves
10 Too much family separation
11 Can't get the education or skill training I want
12 Poor quality of Commissary/Exchange
13 Can't get into the MOS I want
14 Poor quality of medical care
15 Dislike field duty
16 Housing not available or of poor quality
17 Can't get the duty/duty stations I want
18 Dislike the kind of people I must work with
19 Not enough promotional opportunity
20 Not enough reenlistment bonus money
21 Dislike deployments aboard ship
22 My spouse does not want me to stay in. . .
.
23 Not enough chance to do more interesting work
24 I want to live near my parents or relatives
25 I feel that my current job is not worthwhile
26 Lack of help/information from my career planner
27 Working hours are too long
28 Fear of losing more fringe benefits
29 Not being treated with respect
30 Poor quality of dental care
31 Dislike personal appearance standards 1.78 * 1.19
32 Too much racial prejudice 1.91 1.32
33 Too much sexual harassment 1.28 * 0.77
34 Too much sexual discrimination 1.62 * 1.20
Note: * - denotes responses excluded from further analysis. Responses
are numbered in the order they appear on the questionnaire.
Part A, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the

































Fourteen questionnaire responses were excluded from
further study based on low mean values with corresponding low
standard deviations (in comparison to the other responses) .
A low mean value indicates that the response was of little
importance in general to the sample respondents in influencing
their decisions to separate. A corresponding low standard
deviation indicates that survey respondents uniformly assigned
a low value to the response. Furthermore, the responses
dealing with sexual harassment and discrimination were
recently added to the questionnaire and had few responses
during the period studied here. They were consequently
excluded from further analysis. Additionally, response 22
("My spouse does not want me to stay in the Marine Corps") was
retained for cross-tabulation based on marital status (despite
its low mean and low standard deviation) to determine its
importance to the saunple's married respondents.
Following the exclusions, 20 responses remained in section
six of the survey for further analysis. Part A of the sixth
section directs the respondent to indicate how important each
response has been in influencing the Marine's decision not to
reenlist. As described above, the respondent is able to
indicate one of five different degrees of importance, ranging
from "extremely important" to "not true or of no importance".
Since all of the responses (except the last) allow for some
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degree of importance, responses were combined to create a
clearer picture of which ones had the most influence on
separating. Responses "extremely important" and"very
important" were combined, as were "important" and "of some
importance". The final response, "not true or of not
importance", remained unchanged. As a result, in Part A, the
20 responses had three possible markings, not five.
The combining of responses in Part A provides one method
for conducting frequency analysis. This study exaunines the
percentage of Marines who marked each response with the
combined response of "extremely important" and "very
important". Simply, the response with the highest percentage
had the most influence on the respondents' decisions not to
reenlist. In the data analysis section, the responses with
their corresponding percentages are presented for the entire
data base and by occupational area. Furthermore, the 20
responses are cross-tabulated against the demographic
variables mentioned above.
Another method of frequency analysis utilizes Part B of
the questionnaire's sixth section. Part B contains three
columns, and instructs the respondent to mark "the most
important reason, " "second most important reason, " and "third
most important reason," in deciding not to reenlist. The
respondent is instructed to mark only one response in each
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column. In this study, the three choices are combined to
formulate an average percentage of Marines who marked each
response as either the first, second, or third most important
reasons. For instance, if a response was marked by 12 percent
of the respondents as the most important reason, and it was
also marked by ten percent as second most important and by
eight percent as third most important, then the response would
have an average rating of ten percent. (In this example, the
combination of response frequencies add up to 30 percent,
which is then divided by three, the total number of possible
markings
.
) The responses with the three highest percentages
are presented for the entire data base and by occupational
area. The results of Part B analysis are also cross-tabulated
against the demographic variables. It is expected that the
analyses of Parts A and B will yield similar results
concerning questionnaire responses that have the most impact
on the decisions not to reenlist.
The final portion of the data analysis section evaluates
current reenlistment incentives in light of the reasons given
by first-term Marines for leaving active duty. Several
responses are directly related to existing incentives, such
as type of duty, duty station location, availability of skill
training, and the amount of SRB money. The response dealing
with SRB money (number 20 in Table 3) is not expected to be
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of much importance, since the observations are from Marines





Data from the enlisted separation questionnaires are
analyzed using cross-tabulations and frequency distributions.
The analysis is divided into three sections. In the first
section, the data are examined by the demographic variables
of marital status, gender, race, and pay grade. The second
section focuses on the possible relationships between reasons
for separation and an individual's occupational skill. The
final section addresses the ability of current reenlistment
incentives to counter the dominant factors influencing the
separation of Marines in critical skill groups.
B. DATA ANALYSIS BASED ON DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
1. Marital Status
Table 4 compares the responses of married and single
personnel concerning their reasons for not reenlisting on the
Enlisted Separation Questionnaire (Part A, Section 6) . Both
groups were similar in the percentage of those marking "not
enough promotional opportunity" (42.1 percent for married,
40.6 percent for single) and "pay and allowances
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PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES (IN CRITICAL MOSs)




Reason for Not Reenlisting
MARITAL STATUS
Married Single
2 Too many petty regulations
3 Assigned work doesn't use educational skills
4 Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor
5 Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I
6 Pay and allowances are too low
7 Lack of recognition for doing a good job
10 Too much family separation
11 Can't get the education or skill training I wa
14 Poor quality of medical care
16 Housing not available or of poor quality
17 Can't get the duty/duty stations I want
18 Dislike the kind of people I must work with
19 Not enough promotional opportunity
20 Not enough reenlistment bonus money
22 My spouse does not want me to stay in....
23 Not enough chance to do more interesting work
25 I feel that my current job is not worthwhile
27 Working hours are too long
2 9 Not being treated with respect





















Note: The above values reflect the percentage of respondents indicating
each reason was "extremely important" or "very important" in
influencing their decisions to not reenlist. Numbers in
parentheses show the first, second and third highest percentage
within each category.
Source: Part A, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the
third quarter of fiscal 1989.
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are too low" (34.6 percent married, 34.8 percent single).
However, for nearly half of the married personnel (49.9
percent)
, "too much family separation" was the most important
reason for not reenlisting. Additionally, 36 percent of the
single respondents indicated that "too many petty regulations"
was the second most important reason. The largest differences
in the two groups occur in responses dealing with the family.
In addition to family separation, the quality of medical care
and, quite expectedly, the concerns of the spouse were
important reasons to married personnel for separating. The
lack of freedom to use non-working hours was noticeably more
important to single Marines than to those who were married
(29.4 percent for single, 22.9 percent for married).
Analysis of Part B yield virtually the same results
as described above. As shown in Figure 3, "too much family
separation" was marked by 12.8 percent of married personnel
as one the of three most important reasons, followed by the
responses involving promotion (8.9 percent) and pay (8.5
percent. For single personnel, the three most important
reasons remained the same. However, "too many petty
regulations" received the most marks (10.2 percent), followed














Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 1989.
Figure 3. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, by Marital
Status
2 . Gender
Table 5 displays the differences between men and women
in their stated reasons for not reenlisting (Part A) . The
most noticeable difference between how men and women
PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES (IN CRITICAL MOSs)
GIVING REASON FOR NOT REENLISTING, BY GENDER
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE
No. Reason for Not Reenlisting
2 Too many petty regulations
3 Assigned work doesn't use educational skills
4 Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor
5 Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I
6 Pay and allowances are too low
7 Lack of recognition for doing a good job
10 Too much family separation
11 Can't get the education or skill training I wa
14 Poor quality of medical care
16 Housing not available or of poor quality
17 Can't get the duty/duty stations I want
18 Dislike the kind of people I must work with
19 Not enough promotional opportunity
20 Not enough reenlistment bonus money
22 My spouse does not want me to stay in....
23 Not enough chance to do more interesting work
25 I feel that my current job is not worthwhile
27 Working hours are too long
29 Not being treated with respect












Note: The above values reflect the percentage of respondents indicating
each reason was "extremely important" or "very important" in
influencing their decisions to not reenlist. Numbers in
parentheses show the first, second and third highest percentage
within each category.
Source: Part A, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the
third quarter of fiscal 1989.
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marked the questionnaire is that men placed comparatively more
importance on 13 of the 20 reasons for not reenlisting. Women
indicate that famiily separation is the most important reason
for not reenlisting. Also of importance to women is their
apparent desire to do more interesting or challenging work
(32.3 percent). However, this result is not duplicated by
similar responses that address skill training or type of
duty/duty station to which men ascribed more importance (skill
training - 28.7 percent men, 23 percent women; duty/duty
station - 19 percent men, 14 percent women) . Additionally,
both sexes indicate that the lack of promotional opportunity
is an important reason for separating (41.2 percent men, 38.3
percent women) , while men marked the responses concerning low
pay and petty regulations the second and third most frequently
(35.3 and 34.1 percent respectively).
The results shown in Figure 4 (Part B) confirm the
above finding for men, where promotions, regulations, and pay
are the most important reasons for not reenlisting. For
women, family separation remains the most important reason;
but Part B introduces two different reasons for separating
that rank second and third. "Too many petty regulations"
becomes the second most important reason for women, and the
concerns of the spouse becomes the third most important reason
for women not reenlisting. Further research showed that 139
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of the 243 women (59.4 percent) were married. This result
suggests that married women attributed family concerns as a
dominating factor for not reenlisting, and their concerns







Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 1989.
Figure 4. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, by Gender
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3. Race
Minority respondents (those in the sample population
other than whites) placed a greater level of importance on 15
of the 19 responses in Table 6. Not surprisingly, the largest
difference between the two groups concerns the marking of the
response addressing the presence of racial prejudice (25
percent for minorities, 12.1 percent for whites). Other
noticeable differences occur in responses dealing with job
skills and money to which minorities placed much more
importance. With regard to job skills, 35.1 percent of
minorities (27.2 percent whites) pointed out the desire for
more education or skill training, and 25.7 percent (17.6
percent of whites) indicated they were unable to obtain the
duty or duty station they wanted. With regard to money, 39.5
percent of minorities (34 percent of whites) indicated
dissatisfaction with the pay and allowances, and 32.1 percent
(27.2 percent of whites) showed displeasure with the amount
of SRB money.
Referring back to Table 2, one can see that minorities
are over-represented in the sample in the occupational areas
of Infantry/Gun Crews and Functional Support Administration.
Of the eight occupational areas, these two are not the most
technical. The results suggest that many minorities in the
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TABLE 6. PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES (IN CRITICAL MOSs)
GIVING REASON FOR NOT REENLISTING, BY RACE
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE
No. Reason for Not Reenlisting
RACE
White Minority
Too many petty regulations
Assigned work doesn't use educational skills
Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor
Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I
Pay and allowances are too low
Lack of recognition for doing a good job
Too much family separation
Can't get the education or skill training I wa
Poor quality of medical care
Housing not available or of poor quality
Can't get the duty/duty stations I want
Dislike the kind of people I must work with
Not enough promotional opportunity
Not enough reenlistment bonus money
Not enough chance to do more interesting work
I feel that my current job is not worthwhile
Working hours are too long
Not being treated with respect








The above values reflect the percentage of respondents indicating
each reason was "extremely important" or "very important" in
influencing their decisions to not reenlist. Numbers in
parentheses show the first, second and third highest percentage
within each category.
Part A, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the
third quarter of fiscal 1989.
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data set may have desired different skill training or duties.
Furthermore, the minority group's added emphasis on low pay
and inadequate bonus money suggests that these Marines
considered their critical skills, whether technical or not,
more marketable outside the military.
Responses to Part B (Figure 5) yield identical results
for the majority group, showing that promotion, regulations,
and pay are the three most important reasons for not
reenlisting. For the minority group, low pay becomes the most
important reason, followed by the responses dealing with
promotions and regulations.
4 . Pay Grade
Table 7 compares the responses of Marines in different
pay grades in the marking of Part A. The most notable
difference is that E-3s placed much higher importance on 15
of the 19 responses. Besides the expected high proportion who
marked the response addressing promotional opportunity (58.7
percent) , E-3s show greater dissatisfaction with the amount
of recognition and respect they receive. Almost half (46.8
percent) of the E-3s (32.4 percent of E-4s, and 22.4 percent
of E-5s) marked "lack of recognition" as being an important
reason for not reenlisting. In addition, 41.8 percent of E-
3s (31.9 percent of E-4s, and 23.6 percent of E-5s) felt they
were not treated with respect. In actuality, these three
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areas (promotion, recognition, and respect) are intertwined
in that promotion is a form of recognition, and respect is








Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 1989.
Figure 5. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, by Race
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PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES (IN CRITICAL MOSs)
GIVING REASON FOR NOT REENLISTING, BY PAY GRADE
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE
Reason for Not Reenlisting
PAY GRADE
E-3 E-5
2 Too many petty regulations
3 Assigned work doesn't use educational skills
4 Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor
5 Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I
6 Pay and allowances are too low
7 Lack of recognition for doing a good job
10 Too much family separation
11 Can't get the education or skill training I wa
14 Poor quality of medical care
16 Housing not available or of poor quality
17 Can't get the duty/duty stations I want
18 Dislike the kind of people I must work with
19 Not enough promotional opportunity
20 Not enough reenlistment bonus money
23 Not enough chance to do more interesting work
25 I feel that my current job is not worthwhile
27 Working hours are too long
29 Not being treated with respect



















The above values reflect the percentage of respondents indicati
each reason was "extremely important" or "very important
influencing their decisions to not reenlist. Numbers in parenthes
show the first, second and third highest percentage within ea
category.
Part A, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnair<
collected between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter
fiscal 1989.
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Marines in higher pay grades assigned slightly more importance
to the response involving education/skill training (28.9 percent
E-4s, 28.1 percent E-5s, and 26.4 percent E-3s) . In addition,
responses dealing with the family (family separation and medical
care) were chosen by a larger proportion of Marines in the higher
pay grades. Family separation was the most important reason for
E-5s not reenlisting (32.7 percent, compared to 30.4 percent of E-
4s and 25.8 percent of E-3s) . In addition, Marines in the higher
pay grades indicated more concern with the quality of medical care
(24 percent E-5s, 21.3 percent E-3s, and 17.9 percent E-3s)
.
Further research showed that pay grade is related to marital
status. For E-5s, 39.2 percent are married, as compared to 32.2
percent of E-4s, and 29.8 percent of E-3s. This result partially
explains the importance of family-related matters with the
respondents of higher pay grade. Moreover, the married E-5s
influenced the results of the E-5 group as a whole.
Figure 6 shows similar results to those described above for
E-4s and E-5s. Although the order is inconsistent, regulations,
promotions, and pay are the most important reasons for E-4s, while
pay, family separation, and regulations are the most important for
E-5s. Lack of promotional opportunity is overwhelmingly the most
important reason for not reenlisting among E-3s. However, low pay
and petty regulations rank as the second and third most important









8.9 8.7 90 8.5 8.4
Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 1989.




Concluding Remarks Based on Demographic Variables
Analysis of the separation questionnaires based on
demographic variables yielded important differences between
the groups. Married and women Marines showed relatively
higher concern for family-oriented responses, as did E-5s.
A larger percentage of minorities and E-3s chose reasons
involving recognition and respect. (Further research showed
that lower pay grade is associated with minority status in
the sample population. Specifically, 16 percent of E-3s were
minority, as compared to 14.2 percent of E-4s, and 7.7 percent
of E-5s.) Lack of promotion opportunities dominated all
groups, except E-5s. Based upon the above results and the
information in Tables 1 and 2, the typical respondent in the
data set would be a single, white male in pay grade E-4. As
such, the dominance of these demographic characteristics
suggests that for all observations combined, the most
important reason for not reenlisting would be lack of
promotional opportunity, followed by low pay and petty
regulations. In the next section, the data are analyzed as
a whole and examined by DoD occupational areas.
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C. DATA ANALYSIS BASED ON DOD OCCUPATIONAL AREA
1. All First -Term Marines in Critical MOSs
Table 8 displays the entire data set with
corresponding percentages of respondents who marked each
response as either "extremely important" or "very important"
in influencing their decision not to reenlist. The responses
are listed in order from highest to lowest percentage.
Additionally, response 27 ("working hours are too long") was
excluded, because analysis from the preceding section showed
that it was relatively unimportant among the various reasons
for not reenlisting. Responses addressing promotion
opportunities (41.2 percent), low pay (34.8 percent), and lack
of recognition (33.9 percent) were selected by a larger
proportion of respondents. Part B results, shown in Figure
7, replicate the respondents' attitudes toward promotion and
pay, while the respondents' distaste for petty regulations
becomes the second most important reason.
Table 9 presents a matrix of percentages based on Part
A of the questionnaire. The rows are formed by the 18
questionnaire responses, and the nine columns represent the
DoD occupational areas. (Note: Occupational area six is
subdivided into two groups, aircraft and non-aircraft
specialties.) The matrix provides the basis for analysis by
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PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES GIVING RESPONSES
FOR NOT REENLISTING, FROM HIGHEST TO LOWEST
IMPORTANCE, ALL CRITICAL MOSs
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE
No. Reason for Not Reenlisting
PERCENTAGE
19 Not enough promotional opportunity 41.2
6 Pay and allowances are too low 34.8
7 Lack of recognition for doing a good job 33.9
2 Too many petty regulations 33.7
2 9 Not being treated with respect 32.7
10 Too much family separation 2 9.8
11 Can't get the education or skill training I want 28.3
20 Not enough reenlistment bonus money 27.9
5 Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want 27.3
4 Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor 26.9
23 Not enough chance to do more interesting work 25.7
14 Poor quality of medical care 21.1
25 I feel that my current job is not worthwhile 19.0
17 Can't get the duty/duty stations I want 18.8
18 Dislike the kind of people I must work with 18.3
3 Assigned work doesn't use educational skills 17.5
16 Housing not available or of poor quality 17.1
32 Too much racial prejudice 13.9
Note: The cibove values reflect the percentage of respondents
indicating each reason was "extremely important" or
"very important" in influencing their decisions to not
reenlist
.
Source: Part A, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the
third quarter of fiscal 1989.
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occupational area. The matrix in Table 9 is examined both by















Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 1989.
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2 . Infantry amd Gxin Crens
For Marines in occupational area 0, one can see that
the most important response (as measured by highest
percentage) concerns the lack of skill training or desired
education. Not only was this response the most important,
Marines from no other occupational placed more importance
(48.4 percent) on this reason for not reenlisting.
Furthermore, this trend is reflected in other responses
involving the respondents' satisfaction with their work. In
comparison to the other occupational areas. Marines in
occupational area ascribed the most importance (33 percent)
to the response that concerns their assigned work not using
their educational skills. In addition, they placed the second
highest percentage of marks (28.6 percent) on the response
addressing their current job being worthwhile, and the third
highest percentage of marks (34.1 percent) on response 23
("Not enough chance to do more interesting/challenging work")
.
As a result, although concerns with promotion and regulations
rank second and third, respectively, by column, the results
show that dissatisfaction with work and the desire for more
education or skill training are the overriding reasons why
Marines in this occupational area chose to separate.
Analysis of Part B confirms that the desire for more
education or skill training is the primary reason for Marines
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in critical infantry or gun crew MOSs to not reenlist (see
Figure 8) . The second and third most important reasons
concern low pay and petty regulations. The dominance of the
response concerning more education or skill training brings
into question its wording. The results are unable to
distinguish whether the respondents actually desired more
"education" or more "skill training". (The wording of this
response is discussed in Chapter V.)
3 . Electronic Equipment Repairers
Lack of promotional opportunity is the most important
reason for not reenlisting among Marines in this occupational
area. In comparison to Marines in the other areas, this
reason was chosen by a relatively low percentage (37.5
percent) of respondents in occupational area one. This can
be partly explained by referring back to Table 1, which shows
that this occupational area has the second-highest percentage
of E-5s (25.2 percent), and the second-lowest percentage of
E-3s (13.9 percent). The second most important reason
concerns petty regulations, to which these Marines assigned
the third-highest percentage of marks (35.7 percent) among
respondents in all occupational areas. Lack of respect is
the third most important reason, and as above, these Marines
ascribed the third-highest percentage of marks (33.6 percent)


















Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 1989, and DoD Occupational Conversion
Manual, Jan 1989.
Figure 8. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term
Marines, DoD Occupational Area O
duplicate the respondents' concern with not being treated with
respect. Figure 9 shows that concern with regulations,
promotions, and pay are the three top reasons for not










Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 1989, and DoD Occupational Conversion
Manual, Jan 1989.
Figure 9. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term
Marines, DoD Occupational Area 1
Other marking trends worth noting for Marines in
occupational area one address the quality of medical care and
amount of reenlistment bonus money. These Marines assigned
the third-highest percentages (21.6 percent and 29.2 percent.
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respectively) to these responses as compared to the remaining
sample. No trends or conclusions can be drawn from these
findings based on the demographic variables mentioned earlier.
4 . Communications and Intelligence Specialists
The respondents from occupational area two indicate
that lack of promotional opportunity is the most important
reason for not reenlisting. This reason received the third-
highest proportion of responses (45.2 percent) from Marines
assigned to this occupational area. Moreover, analysis of
Part B reveals the same results (see Figure 10) . This result
is somewhat unexpected, since this occupational area has the
highest percentage of E-5s (26.6 percent) and the third-
lowest percentage of E-3s (14.3 percent) among respondents in
all occupational areas.
The second and third most important reasons for not
reenlisting for Marines in occupational area two concern lack
of respect (32.2 percent) and petty regulations (28.7
percent) . The concern with petty regulations is in line with
the demographic trend noted earlier for whites, and this group
has a relatively high percentage of while respondents (93.5
percent) . However, their concern with lack of respect cannot
be attributed to previously discussed demographic factors.
Nor is it duplicated in the analysis of Part B, which shows
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low pay and petty regulations as the second and third most



















The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire f collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 198 9, and DoD Occupational Conversion
Manual, Jan 1989.
Figure 10. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term
Marines, DoD Occupational Area 2
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A final trend worth noting for Marines in occupational
area two involves the generally low levels of importance that
they placed on each of the questionnaire responses. Except
for the response concerning promotion opportunity, the
resulting percentages in Part A were relatively low in
relation to other occupational areas. This trend is in line
with the responses of personnel in higher pay grades. A final
distinguishing feature of this group is its high average GT
score of 119.6 (not shown here) . This is by far the highest
average among occupational areas, compared to the data set
average of 108.9.
5. Technical and Allied Specialists
Two trends can be identified from the observations of
Marines assigned to occupational area four. The first trend
concerns the lack of job satisfaction among these Marines.
In comparison to the other occupational areas, these Marines
ascribed the highest percentage of marks to the reasons
concerning their opportunity to do more interesting or
challenging work (45.8 percent) and their current jobs being
worthwhile (33.3 percent). Additionally, response three
("Work I am assigned doesn't use educational skills") and
response 11 ("Can't get the education or skill training I
want") received the second-highest proportion of marks (27.8
and 40.3 percent, respectively) from these Marines.
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Analysis of Part B confirms this group's overall job
dissatisfaction (see Figure 11) . Although distaste for petty
regulations ranks as the most important reason for not
reenlisting, this group's desire for more interesting work
and the inability to receive more education (or skill
training) rank as the second and third most important reasons,
respectively.
The second trend involves this group's personal
relationships at work. Compared to the remaining occupational
areas, these Marines ascribed the highest percentage of marks
(2 9.2 percent) to response 18 ("Dislike the kind of people I
must work with"), and the second-highest percentage (29.2
percent) to response four ("Poor leadership of my immediate
supervisor" )
.
It should be noted that the Technical and Allied
Specialists represent the smallest occupational area in the
data set. (As shown in Table 1, this area comprises only 1.5
percent of the total sample.) Moreover, of this group's 72
observations, 66 are from one MOS, Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical (NBC) Defense Specialist (MOS 5711) . Therefore, the
trends mentioned above may apply more to NBC Defense














Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 198 9, and DoD Occupational Conversion
Manual, Jan 1989.
Figure 11. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term
Marines, DoD Occupational Area 4
6 . Fxinctional Support and Administration
Among the eight occupational areas, area five contains
the largest percentages of respondents who are women (18
percent) or minorities (27.1 percent) . The three most
important reasons from analysis of Part A are lack of
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promotional opportunity (36 percent), low pay (34.3 percent),
and lack of recognition (33.5 percent) . The importance of
pay-related responses was noted in the previous discussion of
minorities and partly explains the high ranking of low pay.
It may also explain the importance of the response that
addresses the amount of reenlistment bonus money, which
received the second-highest percentage of marks (2 9.5 percent)
in comparison to all occupational areas.
Despite relatively large representation of women, this
group as a whole, does not reveal the concern with family-
related matters and the desire to do more interesting work
that was noted earlier for women as a group. However, a high
percentage of Marines in functional support and administrative
billets marked response 17 ("Can't get the duty/duty station
I want"), which received the second-highest percentage (23.4
percent) among all occupational areas. Analysis of Part B
(see Figure 12) shows low pay as the most important reason for
these Marines not reenlisting, followed by petty regulations
and lack of promotional opportunity.
7. Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers (Aircraft)
As noted earlier, occupational area six was divided
into subgroups for aircraft and non-aircraft specialties.










Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Source: Part B, Section S, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 198 9, and DoD Occupational Conversion
Manual, Jan 1989.
Figure 12. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term
Marines, DoD Occupational Area 5
promotional opportunity (47.6 percent) is the most important
reason for separating, followed by low pay (40 percent) and
lack of recognition (35.4 percent) . In relation to all
occupational areas, these Marines assigned the highest
98
percentage of marks to low pay (40 percent) and "not enough
reenlistment bonus money" (32.3 percent). The concern
expressed by these Marines with pay and bonus money may be
due to their generally high level of technical training and
their opportunity to pursue higher paying civilian jobs.
Analysis of Part B confirms the concern these Marines
have with promotion and pay, and also reveals petty
regulations as the third most important reason for separating
(see Figure 13) . The lack of promotional opportunity is
evident from this group's pay grade distribution, which shows
this group as having a relatively low percentage of E-5s (9.6
percent) , as compared with 13.7 percent for the entire sample.
The final item to note for Marines in the aircraft
subgroup is the importance they attributed to family-related
matters. Although this group ranks sixth in its percentage
of married personnel (33.5 percent), the responses concerning
feunily separation and quality of medical care received the
second-highest percentage of marks (31.7 and 22.1 percent,
respectively) from these Marines.
8 . Electrical/Mechamical Equipment Repairers (non-
aircraft)
Marines in the non-aircraft subgroup of occupational

















Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 198 9, and DoD Occupational Conversion
Manual, Jan 1989.
Figure 13. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term
Marines, DoD Occupational Area 6.
a
reenlisting concerned promotion (40.6 percent), recognition
(36.6 percent), and regulations (33.6 percent) . The first two
reasons may be partly explained by the comparatively high
percentage of E-3s (22 percent) and low percentage of E-5s
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(9.4 percent) in this subgroup. Analysis of Part B shows
petty regulations as the most important reasons, followed by
lack of promotional opportunity and low pay (see Figure 14)
.
Other questionnaire responses to note for this
subgroup involve its comparison to the remaining occupational
areas. Response 10 ("Too much fsimily separation") received
the highest percentage of marks (31.9 percent) from Marines
in this group despite having the seventh- lowest percentage of
married personnel (33.4 percent) among the eight occupational
areas. Additionally, these Marines ascribed the second-
highest percentage of marks (29.6 percent) to response five
("Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want").
9 . Craftsmen
Compared to all areas. Marines in occupational area
seven placed comparatively higher levels of importance on all
of the questionnaire responses. This group's general
dissatisfaction can be described as either personnel-related
or work-related. For personnel-related matters, the reasons
addressing poor leadership and lack of recognition received
the highest proportion of marks (35 and 37.3 percent,
respectively) from these Marines. They also placed the









Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 1989, and DoD Occupational Conversion
Manual, Jan 1989.
Figure 14. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term
Marines, DoD Occupational Area 6.b
29 ("Not being treated with respect") and the third-highest
percentage (23.9 percent) to response 18 ("Dislike the kind
of people ....")
.
For work-related matters, Marines in occupational area
seven gave the second highest percentage (36.9 percent) to
response 23 (". . .do more interesting/challenging work") . They
also ascribed the third-highest proportion of marks (22 and
33.1 percent, respectively) to responses three ("...assigned
work doesn't use educational skills") and 11 ("Can't get the
education or skill training I want")
.
The results in Figure 15 only support the previous
finding concerning this group's emphasis on low pay. The
other responses identified through analysis of Part B are
petty regulations and promotion opportunities. The concern
with the promotion is interesting, since this group is only
one of two (the other being occupational area four) where lack
of promotion did not rank in the top three reasons from Part
A statistics.
10. Service and Supply Handlers
The final occupational area is similar to the
preceding group in that its respondents place great importance
across a broad range of questionnaire responses when compared
to the other areas. Almost half of these Marines (47.9
percent) chose response 19 ("Not enough promotional
opportunity") as being an important reason for not
reenlisting. This result is in line with the grade structure,
















Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 1989, and DoD Occupational Conversion
Manual, Jan 1989.
Figure 15. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term
Marines, DoD Occupational Area 7
percent) and the second-highest percentage of E-3s (26.6
percent) among all occupational areas. Responses addressing
the following concerns received the highest percentage of
marks from Marines in this group: petty regulations (38
percent) , freedom to use non-working hours (37 percent)
,
poor
quality of medical care (24 percent) , inability to get the
duty/duty stations wanted (24 percent) , and not being treated
with respect (38.5 percent) . Additionally, despite having the
fifth-lowest representation of minority respondents (14.1
percent) , Marines in this group gave the highest proportion
of marks (20.8 percent) to the response concerning racial
prejudice
.
Analysis of Part B duplicates two of the most
frequently marked responses from Part A, promotion
opportunities and low pay (see Figure 16) . Additionally, the
findings from Part B show that distaste for petty regulations
was marked most frequently by these Marines as one of the
three most important reasons for not reenlisting. Considering
both Parts A and B, Marines in occupational area eight, on
average, placed more importance across a broader range of
responses than did Marines in any of the other occupational
areas
.
11. Concluding Remarks Based on DoD Occupational Areas
Analysis of the separation questionnaires reveals
marked variation in the reasons for not reenlisting across
DoD occupational areas. Lack of promotion opportunity is





















Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-
term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above
responses as the first, second, or third most
important reasons for not reenlisting.
Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation
Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third
quarter fiscal 1989, and DoD Occupational Conversion
Manual, Jan 1989.
Figure 16. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term
Marines, DoD Occupational Area 8
respondents. Other questionnaire responses that were
frequently noted as having generally high levels of importance
concerned the following: petty regulations, low pay, lack of
recognition, desire for education or skill training, the
desire for more challenging work, and not being treated with
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respect. In addition, many trends were noted as pertaining
to Marines in particular occupational areas. For instance,
Marines in aircraft specialties of occupational area six
(Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers) attributed the
greatest importance to factors dealing with compensation (pay
and bonuses) . Additionally, Marines in occupational areas
seven (Craftsmen) and eight (Service and Supply Handlers)
generally ascribed more importance across all responses.
Conversely, Marines in occupational areas two (Communication
and Intelligence Specialists) and five (Functional Support and
Administration) assigned relatively low importance to the
responses. In all, first-term Marines (in critical MOSs)
appear to base their decisions to separate on reasons that
are generally linked to the occupational skills they possess.
D. CURRENT REENLISTMENT INCENTIVES
There were few instances in the previous analysis sections
where Marines in critical MOSs mentioned current reenlistment
incentives as an important reason for not reenlisting. The
one questionnaire response that was cited as an important
reason dealt with the education or skill training desired by
the respondents. This was the most important reason for
Marines in occupational area zero (Infantry and Gun Crews) and
the second most important reason for Marines in occupational
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area four (Technical and Allied Specialists) . However, only
the part of this response regarding "skill training" --
nsimely, career progression training -- is related to a
reenlistment incentive. There is cunbiguity as to whether the
respondent's desire for "education" or "skill training"
influenced the selection of this response. Further, it's not
clear whether the desire for skill training is related to a
respondent's current MOS, or to a different one. Since
response 13 ("Can't get into the MOS I want") was excluded
because of relatively low importance, the desire for skill
training is assumed to be within one's MOS. As a result,
Marines in critical MOSs that fall into the above two
occupational areas seem to be influenced in their decision to
separate by the unavailability of skill training.
Considering the incentive of lateral movement into another
MOS, the desire for Marines in critical occupations to pursue
a different specialty is not evident in this study. This
situation is assumed to occur for two reasons. First, the
critical specialties involved in this study are generally more
technical than other occupations in terms of training and
application. Therefore, Marines in critical occupations tend
to receive skills that are not only more valuable to the
Marine Corps, but also more valuable in the civilian job
market. Second, one would expect that a primary reason for
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the MOSs in this study to be defined as "critical" is that the
Marine Corps has a difficult time keeping the required number
of positions filled. Therefore, Marines in a critical skill
would not be offered lateral movement into another critical
skill.
Response 17 from the questionnaire relates directly to
the reenlistment incentive involving choice of duty and duty
station. In comparison to all questionnaire responses, it
was relatively unimportant. However, this response received
higher percentages from Marines in the least technical
occupational areas. Specifically, three of the four highest
percentage of marks received by this response were assigned
by Marines in the following areas: Service and Supply
Handlers (24.0 percent). Functional Support and Administration
(23.4 percent), and Infantry and Gun Crews (23.1 percent).
Additionally, among the demographic groups excimined here,
minorities placed the highest percentage of marks (25.7
percent) on response 17.
Response 20 addresses the adequacy of reenlistment bonus
money. As mentioned in Chapter III, this response was not
expected to be of much importance among the reasons for not
reenlisting. Generally, it was not mentioned by many
respondents, but there are several trends worth noting.
First, Marines in the more technical occupational areas tended
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to place more importance on reenlistment bonus money.
Specifically, this response received two of the three highest
percentage of marks from the aircraft-related
Electrical /Mechanical Equipment Repairers (32.3 percent) and
the Electronic Equipment Repairers (29.2 percent).
Conversely, the lowest percentage among the eight occupational
areas came from the Marines assigned to Infantry and Gun Crews
(13.2 percent). The remaining trends focus on demographic
characteristics. Specifically, the amount of bonus money was
more important to men, minorities, and personnel in lower
grades. Virtually no difference existed between married and
single personnel.
In general, the respondents in this study placed low
levels of importance on questionnaire responses that addressed
current reenlistment incentives. This result suggests that
the respondents were aware of the incentives, yet were not
attracted to reenlist because of dissatisfaction with other
aspects of their work. From the analysis presented in this
chapter, the other aspects include lack of promotion
opportunity, low pay and allowances, petty regulations, and
lack of recognition and respect. In the following chapter,
the results of the study are summarized, and conclusions are
presented that focus on the Enlisted Separation Questionnaire
and current reenlistment incentives. Finally, recommendations
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are offered for possible improvements in current reenlistment
criteria and incentives.
Ill
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
1
.
Identification of Critical Skills
The emphasis of this study is on first-term enlisted
Marines in MOSs that have been critically short from fiscal
1985 to the present, and the dominant reasons why those
Marines decided not to reenlist. The first area of analysis
concerned the identification of critical MOSs in the Marine
Corps. Information that specifically identified the critical
MOSs during the required time frcime was unavailable from HQMC.
As an alternative, critical MOSs were identified using Marine
Corps messages that assigned first-term SRB multiples for each
of the fiscal years between 1985 and 1990. Using criteria
based on average SRB multiple and frequency of multiple
assignment during the stipulated time frame, 177 enlisted MOSs
were identified as "critical" (see Appendix A)
.
2. USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaires
The second area of analysis focused on the examination
of USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaires to determine the
main reasons why Marines in critical MOSs decided to separate.
Data were provided by HQMC containing over 38,000 separation
questionnaires from enlisted Marines who separated from active
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duty between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of fiscal 1989.
Only questionnaires completed by first-term Marines (who were
recommended and eligible for reenlistment) in critical MOSs
were analyzed. As noted in Chapter III, the questionnaires
retained for analysis reflect only the opinions of Marines who
chose to respond; and these opinions may not be representative
of all persons who separated from the Marine Corps over the
indicated time period.
The demographic characteristics of the survey
respondents were first examined with respect to not
reenlisting. The following characteristics were included in
the analysis: marital status, gender, race, and pay grade.
The results showed that both married and single respondents
ascribed high levels of importance to lack of promotion
opportunity and low pay as reasons for not reenlisting.
However, for married personnel, the most important reason to
separate was the amount of family separation. For single
Marines, a distaste for petty regulations strongly influenced
the decision to separate.
Male respondents stated that the most important reason
for not reenlisting involved a lack of promotion opportunity.
Men also indicated they were influenced by low pay and petty
regulations. Women similarly placed high importance on lack
of promotion opportunity and petty regulations. However, for
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women, the most important reason for not reenlisting was
overwhelmingly their concern with feunily separation. This
result was influenced by the fact that a large proportion
(59.4 percent) of female respondents were married.
White respondents indicated that they did not reenlist
for the following reason (in order of importance) : lack of
promotion opportunity, petty regulations, and low pay.
Minority respondents similarly assigned high levels of
importance to lack of promotion opportunity and low pay, along
with lack of recognition. Furthermore, minority respondents
placed comparatively higher levels of importance than did
whites on the desire for education and skill training as well
as different duties. This result likely occurred because the
minority respondents were generally overrepresented in the
least technical MOSs.
As expected, respondents in pay grade E-3 (the lowest
grade for the sample population) indicated that the most
important reason for not reenlisting was lack of promotion
opportunity. Additionally, in comparison to Marines in pay
grades E-4 and E-5, E-3s placed much higher levels of
importance on all but four of the questionnaire responses.
The results suggested that lower pay grade is intertwined with
other reasons for separating, such as lack of recognition and
respect and low pay, and also caused E-3 respondents to have
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comparatively more negative feelings toward their military
experiences
.
Respondents in pay grade E-4 stated that the most
important reasons for not reenlisting were petty regulations,
lack of promotion opportunity, and low pay. E-5s placed the
greatest importance on low pay, family separation, and petty
regulations. In comparison to E-3s, Marines in the higher pay
grades placed greater emphasis on questionnaire responses
involving education and skill training, and the family.
The second basis for analyzing the separation
questionnaires involved the differences between personnel in
the several DoD occupational areas. To perform this analysis,




- Infantry and Gun Crews
2 1 - Electronic Equipment Repairers
3. 2 - Communications and Intelligence Specialists
4 4 - Technical and Allied Specialists
5. 5 - Functional Support and Administration
6. 6 - Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers
a. Aircraft-related
b. Non-Aircraft-related
7. 7 - Craftsmen
8 8 - Service and Supply Handlers
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Table 10 summarizes the most important reasons that
Marines in critical MOSs did not reenlist, based upon DoD
occupational area. In all but three of the areas, respondents
identified lack of promotion opportunity as the most important
reason for not reenlisting (according to analysis of Part A
of the questionnaire) . Respondents in two occupational areas
(Communications and Intelligence Specialists, and
Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers (aircraft-related)
)
also attributed greatest importance to this reason on Part B
of the questionnaire. Respondents from only one other
occupational area (Infantry and Gun Crews) chose the same
reason in both Parts A and B of the questionnaire as being the
most important. These Marines indicated that the inability
to "get the education or skill training" they wanted was the
most important reason for separating.
As shown in Taible 10, the most prominent reason for
not reenlisting from Part B of the questionnaire was distaste
for petty regulations. In all but four of the occupational
areas, respondents identified this factor as the most
important reason for separating. Marines from occupational
area five (Functional Support and Administration) indicated
that low pay was the primary reason for not reenlisting.
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TABLE 10. SUMMARY OF MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR FIRST-TERM
MARINES IN CRITICAL MOSs NOT REENLISTING BY DOD
OCCUPATIONAL AREA
ENLISTED SEPARATION QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
DoD OCC Part A (a) Part B(b) Duplication of
AREA Responses (c)
Can't get education Can't get education Can't get education
or skill training or Bkill training or skill training
Too many petty regs
Too many petty regs
Not enough promotion
opportunity
Too many petty regs
Not enough promotion
opportunity
Too many petty regs
Want more inte !Sting Too many petty regs Want i
challenging worl
Too many petty regs
Can't get education
or skill training










Too many petty regs
a - Response from analysis of Pi
highest combined percentage of marks
important" or very "important" in Influen
to not reenlist.
b - Response from analysis of Part B, Secti
most marks as being the first, second, <
reason for not reenlisting.
c - Responses that were duplicated as being
important reasons for not reenlisting in
Section 6 that received the
as being "extremely
ing Marines' decisions
USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected
between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of fiscal
1989, and DoD Occupational Conversion Manual, Jan
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The final column of Table 10 lists the items that were
marked by respondents (within each occupational area) on both
Parts A and B of the questionnaire as the top three reasons
for not reenlisting. The most frequently duplicated reasons
for separating, in order, were lack of promotion opportunity,
petty regulations, and low pay. In all but two of the
occupational areas (Technical and Allied Specialists and
Craftsmen) , respondents duplicated two reasons for not
reenlisting.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions of this research deal with three areas.
The first area involves the results of the data analysis.
The second area concerns the construction of the
enlistedseparation questionnaire and wording of the
questionnaire responses. The final area focuses on the
apparent inability of current Marine Corps reenlistment
incentives to influence the behavior of certain Marines in
critical MOSs.
1 . Results of Analysis
The results of this study suggest that there are
diverse reasons why Marines in critical MOSs do not reenlist.
This study attempted to show variation in the responses based
on demographic factors and between DoD occupational areas.
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With regard to demographic factors (marital status, gender,
race, and pay grade) , several reasons for not reenlisting were
generally important to all respondents regardless of
background characteristics. Among these reasons were lack of
promotion opportunity, low pay, and petty regulations.
Conversely, other reasons for separating were tied directly
to particular demographic factors. For instance, women, E-
5s, and married respondents placed much greater emphasis on
questionnaire items that addressed family concerns.
Additionally, minority respondents showed a much grater desire
(in comparison to all demographic groups) for education and
skill training, and for a specific duty or duty station.
The primary reasons for not reenlisting also varied
by occupational group. As previously noted, the questionnaire
responses addressing promotion opportunities, petty
regulations, and low pay were consistently found to be of more
importance in explaining separation. However, other
questionnaire responses stand out among particular
occupational areas. For example. Marines in occupational area
zero (Infantry and Gun Crews) overwhelmingly placed more
importance on the desire for education or skill training.
The final conclusion involving the results deals with
the diversity found between analyses of Parts A and B of the
separation questionnaire. In general, analysis of Part A
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allowed much more variation to be displayed between
demographic groups as well as groups with similar occupational
skills. Conversely, analysis of Part B showed much less
variation. The attempt to compare reasons for separating
between groups based on Part B provided inconclusive results.
Marines in seven of the nine subgroups (based on DoD
occupational area) marked the same three items (petty
regulations, lack of promotion opportunity, and low pay) as
being the top three reasons for separating. Moreover, in four
of those seven subgroups, the top three reasons fell into the
identical order of importance as listed above.
Because results from Part B of the questionnaire
revealed very little variation across demographic factors or
occupational areas, they were used basically as a supplement
to results found in Part A. Therefore, analysis of Part B
served more as a check of relicibility for Part A findings than
as a tool for showing diversity between different groups.
2 . Enlisted Separation Questionnaire
Two problems were found concerning the construction
and wording of the questionnaire. First, there are probably
too many reasons for separating listed on the questionnaire.
Fifteen of the 34 questionnaire responses were removed from
this study because of their relatively low importance to the
sample of first-term Marines. Moreover, several of the listed
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reasons may be of little importance to any Marine deciding to
separate
.
Another concern involves the duplicity of reasons
listed on the questionnaire. For exaunple, a Marine who wants
to serve in a different MOS (conveyed in questionnaire
response 13) may also feel that his or her current job is not
worthwhile (response 25) and would probably like to do more
interesting or challenging work (response 23) . At the Scune
time, that Marine probably cannot get the duty he or she wants
(response 17) and may feel that his or her educational skills
are not being used on the job (response 3)
.
The problems with duplicity are further compounded in
that the questionnaire sometimes uses two separate responses
to express almost identical topics. For instance, too much
sexual harassment (response 33) is probably indistinguishable
from too much sexual discrimination (response 34) for most
respondents (though the reasons are technically different)
.
Duplication of questionnaire responses may cause
several problems. First of all, because the number of reasons
for separating is unnecessarily increased, the respondent may
be overwhelmed by the size of the questionnaire and the time
needed to fill it out. In addition, similar but separate
responses do not allow the respondent to truly distinguish
between the most important reasons for not reenlisting. As
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a result, respondents may be unable or unwilling to respond
to the questionnaire in a manner that would provide the most
beneficial data for analysis.
There is also some sunbiguity in the wording used to
describe two of the reasons for not reenlisting. First, as
noted in Chapter IV, it is not clear whether the desire for
more "education or skill training" (response 11) influenced
the Marines in occupational area zero (Infantry and Gun Crews)
to attribute such a high level of importance to that response.
"Education" seems to pertain more to civilian-type education
(perhaps college-level classes) . Conversely, "skill training"
implied advanced training in one's primary MOS (perhaps SCUBA,
parachute, or Ranger training for infantrymen) or even
training in a different MOS.
There is a similar problem in the wording of the
questionnaire response regarding availability of a particular
duty or duty station (response 17) . A specific duty may imply
assignment to a normal tour outside of one's primary MOS.
Such assignments, as noted in Chapter II, include drill
instructor, recruiter, or Marine Security Guard. Receiving
one of the above duties would not change a Marine's primary
MOS.
The above questionnaire response is even more
confusing because it includes the phrase "duty stations".
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The inability to be assigned to a duty station conveys the
unmet desire to live and work in a specific geographic region.
Obviously, this interpretation of response 17 is quite
different than that explained in the above paragraph.
Another problem with the questionnaire responses is
that they mainly address the military-related factors that
"push" Marines out of the military. (This topic is discussed
in Chapter I.) The absence of civilian-related factors that
may "pull" Marines out of the military forces respondents to
attribute their reasons for separating to "negative" aspects
of service life. For example, the response that military "pay
and allowances are too low" (response six) begs the question:
too low compared to what? For a separating first-term Marine
who has received technical skill training, has served a
minimum of four years on active duty, and is still relatively
young, the comparison is unquestionably on what can be earned
in the civilian sector. An alternative response could be "I
can receive higher pay and benefits in a civilian job".
Another poorly-worded questionnaire response that
allows the respondent to attribute his or her reason for
separating solely to the "negative" aspects of the military
is "too many petty regulations" (response two) . Again, one
wonders what basis for comparison is used when the individual
marks this response. (Perhaps home life, school, a civilian
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job, or other branches of Service?) Prior to joining the
Marine Corps, all persons should know that they will have to
adhere to a strict set of rules and regulations. It's a well-
known aspect of life in the military. Therefore, a respondent
who marks this response as being the most important reason for
not reenlisting is simply one who was dissatisfied at having
to personally adjust to the regulations that govern military
life. An alternative response could be "I can't accept all
the rules and regulations".
3 . Current Reenlistmant Incentives
As discussed in Chapter IV, the unavailability of
current reenlistment incentives was not found to be
particularly important in influencing the separation of
Marines in critical MOSs. The other side to this study is
how Marines in critical MOSs who did reenlist were influenced
in their decisions by the incentives. This could likely be
answered by a study involving not only the Marines who
reenlisted, but also the unit career planners who have first-
hand responsibility for monitoring reenlistment trends.
There are two reasons that current reenlistment
incentives are believed to be of little importance to the
Marines in this study. First, the available incentives, for
the most part, did not address the primary concerns of the
respondents. "Not enough promotional opportunity" was
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undoubtedly a very important reason why Marines in this sample
did not reenlist. In addition, since higher pay is directly
associated with higher pay grade, the importance of promotion
becomes magnified.
No reenlistment incentive is directly tied to
promotion opportunity. The only indirect associations to be
made are that an individual may regard promotion opportunity
as being better by receiving a specific duty assignment,
career progression training, or lateral movement to another
MOS.
The second reason that current reenlistment incentives
are believed to be of little importance is that they are not
tied to the specific act of reenlisting. The only exception
is the SRB. However, in a Service that offers incentives to
its career-oriented members as a way for them to influence
their future (paraphrased from a quote in Chapter II) , the
payment of bonus money does not seem to give enlisted Marines
that stated ability.
The other reenlistment incentives may be requested
and granted at other times while on active duty, not just at
reenlistment. Additionally, requests for a change of duty or
for career progression training are tied less to reenlisting
than to meeting a time-remaining-in-service requirement. For
instance, the initial type of career progression training
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(normally offered to E-4s and E-5s in their primary MOS)
usually requires a Marine to remain on active duty for at
least 12 months after completion of training. If an eligible
candidate does not meet this requirement because of limited
time remaining on an enlistment contract, he or she may still
attend the training without reenlisting. The Marine could
simply extend his or her current enlistment contract to meet
the requirement.
Perhaps, a Marine in the above situation would be more
apt to reenlist as a result of the training (or duty)
received. If not, then the training (or duty) was of less
benefit to the Marine Corps than if it were given to someone
more likely to make the Marine Corps a career.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . Current Reenlistment Criteria
As noted in Chapter II, the reenlistment criteria
currently used by the Marine Corps establish certain minimum
standards. In addition, by allowing many of the criteria to
be waived, the Marine Corps provides reenlistment
opportunities to Marines unable to meet the minimum standards.
It is suggested that the criteria for reenlistment be modified
in a manner that would afford reenlistment opportunities to
the most-qualified Marines. The criteria should not present
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reenlistment opportunities to marginal personnel on an equal
basis with those who are highly qualified. Below are
suggested modifications to the criteria.
a. Reduce the number of criteria that can be
waived by the chain of command.
b. Eliminate the criteria that address education
level and minimum GT score. These criteria appear more
relevant as standards of enlistment.
c. Establish an annual ceiling (by percentage or
number) of reenlistments awarded to E-3s. Just as annual
reenlistment quotas are established at different unit levels,
the scune "quotas" or ceilings could be established for
reenlistments of E-3s.
d. Reduce the number of punitive-related criteria
or eliminate them altogether. A Marine's conduct is already
part of the criterion that requires him or her to have a
minimum average conduct mark of 4.0. Additionally, concern
with punitive-related infractions seems more appropriate when
a Marine is being administratively discharged from active duty
than when being considered for reenlistment.
e. Remove the criteria regarding one's status as
a conscientious objector or as a sole-surviving son or
daughter. These criteria seem more appropriate under draft
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conditions during a large-scale conflict than under volunteer
conditions of a peacetime force.
f. Remove the criteria that rec[uire an
individual's professional competence and moral character to
reflect the prestige and quality standards expected of all
Marines. These criteria pertain more to the collective
character of the Marine Corps than to the abilities of the
individual
.
By adopting the above recommendations, the following
criteria would remain.
a. Be recommended by the commanding officer.
b. Be an E-4 or above. E-3s would be permitted
to reenlist within the command's annual ceiling. (Can be
waived at the Commanding General's level.)
c. Be physically qualified.
d. Pass the physical fitness test and meet
military appearance and height/weight standards.
e. Have a minimum conduct and proficiency average




f. Meet the necessary time-in-service
requirements
.
The above recommendations may be viewed as overly
restrictive, and as not giving a command the flexibility it
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needs to meet first-term reenlistment quotas. However, if
the Marine Corps were to consider adopting additional (or
modifying current) reenlistment incentives, the current
pressure on commands to meet first-term quotas may in turn be
partially relieved. (Note: The Marine Corps achieved almost
98 percent of its first-term reenlistment goal for fiscal
1989, securing 3,529 reenlistments out of a goal of 3,611
[Ref. 35]
.)
2 . Reenlistment Incentives
As observed above, the current incentives offered by
the Marine Corps can probably be improved. The most apparent
need is to tie the incentive directly to the reenlistment
process. In addition, the results of this study suggest that
lack of promotion opportunity is the most important reason
cited by Marines for not reenlisting.
Early in the 1980s, the Marine Corps tied promotion
to first-term reenlistment. In fact, many Marines were
promoted to the next higher pay grade primarily because they
did reenlist. This promotion policy is not recommended as a
result of this study. However, reenlistment is recommended
as a way for first-term Marines to earn bonus points toward
their composite score for promotion. (The composite score is
used to determine Marine Corps promotion to E-4 and E-5.)
Depending on the amount of bonus points (no specific amount
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is suggested) , a Marine may be cdDle to boost his or her
composite score enough to gain promotion. In addition, the
greater likelihood of being promoted following reenlistment
may help to indirectly counter some of the other prominent
reasons why Marines may decide not to reenlist (for exeunple,
concerns with lack of recognition and respect, and low pay)
.
In addition to linking promotion opportunity to
reenlistment, it is suggested that the Marine Corps adopt an
initiative involving the SRB--specifically, award Marines in
higher pay grades a higher bonus in critical MOSs. For
example, an E-5 would rate a higher bonus than an E-4 (who
would rate a higher bonus than an E-3) , even if they are in
the same MOS . In addition, and related to the recommendation
of reenlistment and composite score for promotion, a Marine
who acquires the composite score needed for promotion
following reenlistment would receive the higher bonus. (A
time frame for promotion could be established within which the
Marine could earn the higher bonus (e.g., within six months
after reenlistment.)
Finally, it is recommended that the Marine Corps test
different incentives or combinations of incentives to
determine their impact on reenlistment. As noted in Chapter
I, Doering and Grissmer [Ref. 5] propose testing different
reenlistment incentives with sample sizes ranging from 500 to
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1,000 individuals. These recommended sample sizes are
comparable to many Marine Corps units (battalions. Marine
Expeditionary Units, squadrons, etc.). In addition, there
are career planners within units of that size who understand
why Marines in the unit are separating. The career planner
may also have ideas concerning the types of incentives that
would influence these Marines to reenlist. As a result,
separate units could tailor reenlistment incentive programs
to meet the needs and concerns of their own enlisted
personnel. In turn, enlisted Marines may be more prone to




LIST OF CRITICAL MILITARY OCOTPATIONAL SPECIALTIES,
BY DOD OCCUPATIONAL AREA
For this study, the Marine military occupational
specialties (MOSs) listed below are critical for first-term
Marines. The MOSs are classified by general occupational
areas assigned by the DoD Occupational Conversion Manual (Jan
1989) . The MOSs are listed by their four digit code: the
first two digits indicate the specific Marine Corps
occupational fields; the last two digits indicate the MOSs
within the separate occupational fields. (The occupational




INFANTRY AND GUN CREWS
0313 LAV Crewman
08 61 Fire Support Man
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT REPAIRERS
2800 Data/Communications Maintenance (All MOSs) a,b
5900 Electronics Maintenance (All MOSs) a
6314 Aircraft Communications/Navigation Systems
Technician RF4/F-4
6316 Aircraft Communications /Navigation Systems
Technician KC-130/OV-lO
6323 Aircraft Communications/Navigation Systems
Technician CH-53
6324 Aircraft Communications/Navigation Systems
Technician U/AH-1
132
6352 Aircraft Weapons Systems Specialist A-4/TA-
4/OA-4
6364 Aircraft Weapons Specialist Helicopter/A- 6/OV-
lO/F/A-18
6365 Aircraft Communications/Navigation/Radar Systems
Technician EA-6B
6423 Aviation Electronic Micro-Miniature/ Instrument &
Cable Repair Technician, IMA
64 62 Avionics Test Set Technician, IMA
64 63 Radar Test Section/Radar Systems Test Station
Technician, IMA
64 64 Aircraft Internal Navigation System Technician,
IMA
64 65 Hybrid Test Set Technician, IMA
64 68 A/C Electrical Equipment Test Set /Mobile
Electronics Test Set Technician, IMA
6475 Aircraft Radar/IR Reconnaissance Systems
Technician, IMA
6483 Aircraft Electronics Countermeasures Systems
Technician, Helicopter, IMA
64 92 Aviation PME/ATE Calibration and Repair
Technician
7212 Low Altitude Air Defense Gunner
COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS
0200 Intelligence (All MOSs) a
2 600 Signal Intelligence/Ground Electronic Warfare
(All MOSs) a
7236 Tactical Air Defense Controller
7312 Air Traffic Controller-Tower
7322 Air Traffic Controller-Radar
7372 First Navigator
7382 Airborne Radio Operator/Loadmaster
TECHNICAL AND ALLIED SPECIALISTS
1422 Geodetic Surveyor
2336 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician
5711 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Specialist
FUNCTIONAL SUPPORT AND ADMINISTPATION
3043 Supply Administration and Operations Clerk






604 6 Aircraft Maintenance Administration Clerk
6047 Aircraft Maintenance Data Analysis Technician
7041 Aviation Operations Specialist
ELECTRICAL/MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT REPAIRERS
a. (Aircraft Specialists)
6015 Aircraft Mechanic AV-8/TAV-8
6016 Aircraft Mechanic KC-130
6018 Aircraft Mechanic OV-10
6025 Aircraft Power Plants Mechanic, Rolls Royce
Pegasus
6027 Aircraft Power Plants Mechanic, F-404
6035 Aircraft Power Plants Test Cell Operator, Fixed
Wing
6055 Aircraft Hydraulic/Pnexomatic Mechanic, AV-8/TAV-
8
6056 Aircraft Hydraulic/Pneumatic Mechanic, KC-130
6057 Aircraft Hydraulic/Pneumatic Mechanic, F/A-18
6058 Aircraft Hydraulic/Pneumatic Mechanic, OV-10
6072 Aircraft Maintenance GSE Mechanic
6087 Aircraft Safety Equipment Mechanic, F/A-18
6092 Aircraft Structures Mechanic, A-4/TA-4/OA-4
6093 Aircraft Structures Mechanic, A-6/EA-6
6095 Aircraft Structures Mechanic, AV-8/TAV-8
6096 Aircraft Structures Mechanic, KC-130
6097 Aircraft Structures Mechanic, F/A-18
6098 Aircraft Structures Mechanic, OV-10
6113 Helicopter Mechanic, CH-53
6114 Helicopter Mechanic, U/AH-1
6122 Helicopter Power Plants Mechanic, T-58
6125 Helicopter Power Plants Mechanic, T-400
6135 Aircraft Power Plants Test Cell Operator
Wing
6142 Helicopter Structures Mechanic, CH-46
6143 Helicopter Structures Mechanic, CH-53
6144 Helicopter Structures Mechanic, U/AH-1
6152 Helicopter Hydraulic/Pneumatic Mechanic,
6154 Helicopter Hydraulic/Pneumatic Mechanic,
6333 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician,
6/TC-4C
6335 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician, AV-8






6344 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician, U/AH-1
637 4 Imagery Interpretation Equipment Repair
Technician
647 6 Aerial Camera/ADAS Systems Technician, IMA
7011 Aircraft Recovery Specialist
b. (Non-Aircraft Specialists)
1341 Engineer Equipment Mechanic





2813 Cable Systems Technician
3522 Intermediate Automotive Mechanic
3523 Vehicle Recovery Mechanic
3524 Fuel and Electrical Systems Mechanic
6521 Aviation Ordnance Munitions Technician
6531 Aircraft Ordnance Technician
6541 Aviation Ordnance Equipment Repair Technician
CRAFTSMEN
1100 Utilities (All MOSs) a
1316 Metal Worker
3513 Body Repair Mechanic
6075 Cryogenics Equipment Operator
SERVICE AND SUPPLY HANDLERS
0451 Air Delivery Specialist
3533 Tractor-Trailer Operator
60 60 Flight Equipment Marine
DoD Occupational Conversion Manual, January 198 9
Numerical Index of Military Occupational
Specialties
- Indicates the entire occupational field. No MOSs
are included that are designated for trainees or
for only Staff Sergeants (pay grade E-6) and
above
.
- Does not include MOSs 2811 and 2813, which are










13 Engineer, Construction, and Equipment
14 Drafting, Surveying, and Mapping
21 Ordnance
23 Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Disposal
25 Operational Communications
2 6 Signal Intelligence/Ground Electronic Warfare
28 Data/Communications Maintenance
30 Supply Administration and Operations










72 Air Control/Air Support /Ant iair Warfare
73 Air Traffic Control and Enlisted Fight Crews
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APPENDIX B
USMC ENLISTED SEPARATION QUESTIONNAIRE
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YOUR SINCERE RESPONSES ARE NEEDED TO HELP
IMPROVE DECISIONS AFFECTING MARINE CORPS
PERSONNEL.
MARKING INSTRUCTIONS
> Use only No 2 pencils
> Make heavy black marks that fill tlie circle COMPLETELY
> Erase clearly any answpr you wish to change
> Make no stray marks on the answer sheet
I Complele the front and back ol Ihe form
I Complele Block #5 "Special Answer Section' in Ihe lower
right-hand corner only if you have been given special
Inslructions to do so
1 Every separalirtg enlisted marine shall be requested to conii
this questionnaire for tlie benefit of future Marines If an enhsk
marine refuses to complele this questionnaire, mark decline i
"Complelion Clieck" (box #5) and complele boxes "Name" (3i
and "Social Security No ' (-I) If the enlisted marine completes
form, check to make sure there are no extraneous marks and i
obvious Inilures to lollow diteclions Then mark "verilied in llv
"Complelion Clieck' box (5) A form must be submitted for cv
enlisled marine separalinq
2 These forms may be nccumulatod up to one week Mail
completed original forms in the standard fashion lor optically
scannatile lorms (DO NOT FOLD. STAPLE OR PUNCH HOLES
THE FOHM) to
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
(CODE MPI-20)
WASHINGTON. DC 20380-000 1
3 At times, special inslructions for completing Ihe Special An^.
Section will be distributed The special instructions sliould arcn
pany this questionnaire wlien it is presented to tlie separating
s through the Marine Corps Supply
I
5. Completion Check
UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED COMPLETE BLOCKS
1 THROUGH 4, THEN GO DIRECTLY TO THE BACK OF
THE FORM.
5. Special Answer Section lUse only If Instructed)
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Al( you are VOLUNTARILY SEPARATING; How imporlant haseach of the (ollowing been in your decision to not reenlisl?
I( you are INVOLUNTARILY SEPARATING or RETIRING: How









Alter completing A. indicate
here the 1st. 2nd. and 3rd
most important reasons
Mark Only One In Each Column
Of the 34 poaslbl* reasons . . .
.
1 OOOD'O Dislike physical fitness test standards Q
» OOOOO Too many petty regulations O
• OOOOO VVork lam assigned doesn I use educational skills Q .
4 OOOOO ^°°' leadership of my Immediate supervisor (NCO/SNCO) O
• OOOOO Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want Q
•OOOOO Pay and allowances are loo tow O
7 OOOOO Lack of recognition lor doing a good job O
•OOOOO Fear of losing retiremeni benelils O
• OOOOO Too many permanent change of station moves O
10OOOOO T°o much family separation O •
11 OtlOOO Cant gel the education or skill training I want Q .
'» OOOOO ^°°' quality of Commissary/Exchange Q
"OOOiOO Can t get Into the f^OS 1 want Q •
'* OOOOO Poor quality of medical care Q
"ODOpfO Dislike field duty O
16 OPOQO Housing not available or of poor quality Q
"OOOOO Cant get tlie duty/duty stations I want O
'•OOOOO Dislike the kind of people I must work with O
'•OOOOO Not enough promotional opportunity O
aoOOOOO Not enough reenlistment bonus rrroney O
"OOOOO Dislike deployments aboard ship O
*' OOOOO '"^y spouse does not want me to slay In tlie fvlarine Corps O
83 O.OOOO f^o' enough chance to do more interesting/challenging work O
»" OOOOO I want to live near my parents or relatives O
*» OOOOO "eel that my current job is not worthwhile O
ae OOOOO Lack of help or Inlormalion from my career planners O
»^ OOOOO Working hours are too long Q
"OdOOjO Fear of losing rrwre fringe benefits Q
*» OOOOO f^o' tieing treated with respect Q
'O OOOOO Poo' quality of dental care O
31 OOOOO Dislike personal appearance standards Q
32 OOOOO To° much racial prejudice O
" OOOOO To° much sexual harassment O
34 OOQOO T°° much sexual discrimination Q -.
Please check to be sure you have answered evi
and back of this form If Itie items (above) do nc
your reasons for separating, please stale your r
provided on the right —-
ry ilem on the front
adequately relied
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